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African Union

The African Union strongly condemns the despicable terrorist attacks in Paris, France

Addis Ababa, 14 November 2015: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, is deeply shocked and saddened by the despicable terrorist attacks that took place yesterday in Paris, resulting in the killing of over 100 people and wounding many others.

The Chairperson of the Commission condemns in the strongest terms these cowardly attacks, which cannot be justified under any circumstances. She conveys the AU's most sincere condolences to the families of the victims and to the French Government, and wishes speedy recovery to those wounded. She expresses Africa's full support to, and solidarity with, the French people and Government.

The Chairperson of the Commission reaffirms the AU's total rejection of terrorism and extremism in all their forms and manifestations. She underlines that the Paris attacks are a stark reminder of the need and urgency of renewed international efforts to deal with the scourge of terrorism and extremism. To this end, the Commission will continue to work with the AU Member States and the larger international community to help foster more effective and better coordinated global efforts and response, as well as international peace.

L'Union Africaine condamne énergiquement les attaques terroristes ignobles perpétrées à Paris, en France

Addis Abéba, le 14 novembre 2015: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, est profondément bouleversée et affligée par les attaques terroristes ignobles qui ont eu lieu à Paris, hier, tuant plus de 100 personnes et blessant plusieurs autres.

La Présidente de la Commission condamne, dans les termes les plus énergiques, ces attaques lâches, qui ne peuvent être justifiées en aucune circonstance. Elle offre les condoléances les plus sincères de l'UA aux familles des victimes et au Gouvernement français, et souhaite prompt rétablissement aux blessés. Elle exprime le soutien total de l'Afrique au peuple et au Gouvernement français, et leur témoigne l'entière solidarité du continent.

La Présidente de la Commission réaffirme le rejet total par l'UA du terrorisme et de l'extrémisme sous toutes leurs formes et manifestations. Elle souligne que les attaques qui ont eu lieu à Paris sont un rappel sanglant de la nécessité et de l'urgence d'efforts internationaux redoublés pour faire face au fléau du terrorisme et de l'extrémisme. À cette fin, la Commission continuera à œuvrer avec les États membres et l'ensemble de la communauté internationale pour favoriser une action et une réponse plus efficaces et mieux coordonnées au niveau mondial, ainsi que pour promouvoir la paix internationale.

Why Africa Must Resolve its Maritime Boundary Disputes

11 November 2015

The reasons are clear enough, argues Timothy Walker. The present disputes not only imperil the short- and long-term implementation of needed maritime policies and strategies, they also continue to jeopardize the continent's economic development.

Summary

African maritime boundary disputes, unless resolved in a concerted and timely manner, will imperil both the short and long-term implementation of maritime policies and strategies. African states and stakeholders must prioritise boundary dispute resolution if vital maritime economic development is to occur. This brief first outlines the background against which maritime boundary disputes occur in Africa, and explores why such disputes are a threat to maritime security. This is followed by an overview of the responses and mechanism that can resolve disputes. The third section explores recent contestations and how they are being, or might be, resolved. Some recommendations are made in the final section.

Successfully resolving maritime boundary disputes requires states to overcome a complex and underexplored set of highly technical and political challenges. This is sometimes complicated by the terms and principles used in the discourse. For instance, the words boundary and border are often used interchangeably. In this brief, boundary will refer to the lines that strictly distinguish the sovereign territory of one

state from another. The word border also refers to the territory adjoining the boundary and the various political, economic and social practices that occur between people in these areas.

Background to African boundary disputes

The territory of a state is determined by lines that divide the territory of that state from others. Such boundaries can be demarcated, delineated or delimited. On land, a fence or markers will give a physical indication of a boundary, but such demarcation is hardly possible at sea. Although buoys can be used, these could be removed or damaged, and the numbers required would be huge. Delineation is thus done by means of a set of coordinates that determines the territorial extent of a state.[1] A rich literature exists on resolving boundary disputes on land, but the maritime domain is yet to prominently figure in African boundary and/or border studies.

Post-colonial African states have faced numerous challenges in the process of consolidating their sovereignty. Members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) agreed that upon independence, African states would retain their inherited colonial boundaries.[2] This froze the many boundaries in place. Issues regarding both maritime boundary delineation and management formed a small, but largely neglected part of this process.[3] These issues were set aside or ignored at a time when competing priorities existed with regard to land borders. The maritime domain took a long time to assume the importance it is now perceived to have (a phenomenon often referred to as 'sea blindness'). Maritime boundary disputes, many long dormant, are increasingly Exacerbated by a growing interest in exploring and exploiting natural resources. At present notable border disputes have arisen between Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, and Kenya and Somalia. [4]

A secure maritime domain is becoming a vital part of a country's overall sense of security and economic consideration. It is seen as increasingly indispensable in the context of heightened tensions over the exploration for and discovery of oil in Africa. The interest of states in claiming maritime areas is based on a number of factors. Firstly, improvements in the technological ability to explore and access resources mean the economic viability of such resources has improved. Second, there is growing interest by established and emerging oil companies, and by African states, to open new oil fields, which means that better deals can be secured. The third factor is the quality of African oil and the advantageous geopolitical location of the continent's oil fields relative to Europe and the USA.

However, the location of oil fields and natural resources deposits can result in considerable complications when states unilaterally determine and apportion exploration blocks that infringe upon areas of disputed ownership by a neighbouring state. [5] Exploration blocks are delineated by strict lines, yet oil fields often overlap maritime boundaries. The response to such actual or perceived infringements frequently includes a threat of conflict or war, and this has greatly complicated the development of oil industries in Africa. Conflict deters investment and exploration, and this can heighten the antagonistic relationship between rival states.

This situation can have a destabilising effect on the fight against growing maritime crime and piracy. The effective countering of piracy requires cooperation between states, which is jeopardised if states identify other states as a threat to their national interests and sovereignty. Antagonism and frustration over perceived infringements

of economic interests have yet to boil over into open conflict between African states, but the potential for this cannot be dispelled out of hand. Piracy has raised awareness of the vulnerability of the maritime domain, while numerous counter-piracy campaigns have increased awareness of other maritime crimes such as human and drug trafficking.[6] It has also exposed the maritime weaknesses of individual states; most African states possess a miniscule navy or coast guard and have difficulty in undertaking the necessary counter-activities in their waters.[7]

If left unaddressed, disputes over maritime boundaries and competing claims to resources could seriously hinder or even scupper efforts to construct regional maritime security communities, such as combined economic zones and joint anti-crime operations. It would deal a heavy blow to efforts to create an African 'Blue Economy' as envisioned in the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS). The notable dispute that exists between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire is in part responsible for hindering West African regime building.[8] Meanwhile, East Africa is the location of two types of disputes, one of which concerns the maritime boundary between Kenya and Somalia, and the other the Lake Victoria boundary between Uganda and Kenya.[9]Another notable dispute concerns the boundary between Malawi and Tanzania and the concomitant sovereignty over sections of Lake Malawi.[10] Even though the Lake Victoria and Lake Malawi disputes concern international boundaries, there is the added challenge of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) not being applicable to lakes. This lacuna requires urgent consideration, given the definition of the African Maritime Domain (AMD) located in 2050 AIMS.

The African Maritime Domain

2050 AIMS forms the departure point for any discussion on African maritime security. It is an openly available signifier of African maritime intentions, and is particularly significant in the absence of national and regional strategies.[11] 2050 AIMS defines the end goal and gives the ways and means (indicators), which, if properly implemented and adhered to, are expected to enable significant wealth creation as part of a safe, secure and sustainable African maritime economy. The vision is set out as follows: 'The overarching vision of the ... strategy is to foster increased wealth creation from Africa's oceans and seas by developing a sustainable thriving blue economy in a secure and environmentally sustainable manner'.[12] The strategy was adopted in January 2014 and is presently undergoing a round of evaluation. It is a major, albeit ambitious, document containing the framework, vision and principles that will anchor efforts to develop an African maritime economy and create maritime security.[13]

One pertinent aspect that is notable by its absence from 2050 AIMS is the impact of the AMD definition upon efforts to extend state jurisdiction and sovereignty over the seas and oceans, and how this will affect African international relations. The AMD definition is comprehensive. It pertains to 'all areas and resources of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on an African sea, ocean, or African lakes, intra-coastal and inland navigable waterways, including all African maritime related activities, infrastructure, cargo, vessels and other means of conveyance. It also includes the air above the African seas, oceans, lakes, intra-coastal and inland navigable waterways, and to the oceans' electromagnetic spectrum as well.' [14]

This broad definition tries to capture all relevant jurisdictional areas as well as possible human activities occurring at, in, under or concerning the sea. However, 2050

AIMS goes further by ambitiously including internal or inland waters, such as lakes and rivers. This starkly contrasts with customary maritime practice and maritime legal regimes elsewhere in the world, including UNCLOS. The strategy notes the importance of delimited maritime boundaries as part of the vision, but restricts itself to an assertive call to states to resolve disputes peacefully, pay greater attention to making claims, and ensure that they meet the obligations of UNCLOS and other regimes. This leaves the resolution of boundary disputes up to states without providing any guidance, or ensuring adherence to applicable international legal principles. Nevertheless, the implementation of 2050 AIMS and other REC or national strategies should ensure that a suitable regime for AMD boundary dispute resolution assumes greater significance than has been the case until now.

The maritime domain is defined both as a geographical area and an area that contains numerous activities, preferably marked by instances of cooperation, collaboration and increasing coordination between stakeholders (predominantly states). [15] To divide this vast area and its array of activities so that the activities can be administered and managed peacefully, states are encouraged to claim and enforce sovereignty over their domains. Maritime domains comprise many areas or zones, each with varying degrees of state jurisdiction. For instance, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) will contain resources to which only one state can lay claim and over which only that state has sovereignty.

UNCLOS framed governance challenges as amenable by applying technical concepts that increased the presence and obligations of all states at sea by increasing the total area that states could claim as their territorial waters. It also introduced the revolutionary concept of the EEZ. Under the high-seas conventions that existed prior to UNCLOS, it was customary for the territorial waters of states to terminate three nautical miles offshore. The sea beyond this was the start of the high seas over which no state had sovereignty. After UNCLOS came into force, it became possible for states to claim and possess a belt of territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from their shore.[16] A contiguous area of 24 nautical miles could also be claimed. Furthermore, states were given the right to claim an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from shore. [17] Exclusive economic rights may be exercised in this area, as long as in so doing they do not prejudice the two fundamental rights of other states – freedom of navigation and innocent passage.[18] In the EEZ, the state is responsible for safeguarding all resources from exploitation, but has the right to lay claim to and develop the resources in a legal and sustainable manner.

UNCLOS gives states the right to exploit resources within an area that is determined/measured from baselines along the shore, a process that can be complicated in some places by islands, deltas or an indented or concave shoreline.

Maritime boundaries have value because they determine which areas of the sea fall under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of a particular state. However, there is a crucial distinguishing factor between land and maritime boundaries, namely that some resources, such as fishing stocks, are highly mobile and thus easily traverse boundaries. This also applies to transnational threats such as criminals, pirates and terrorists, or environmental threats such as pollution. Given the transnational nature of both resources and threats, transnational solutions would seem to be the logical next step. Before this can be realised though, the affected boundaries have to be delineated to satisfy the interests of states and reduce tensions over their location.

Maritime boundaries and their importance for security

It is widely assumed that settled maritime boundaries enable stakeholders to establish and consolidate crucial maritime economic activities. These include, but are not limited to, fishing, deep-sea mining, tourism, oceanography and trade. However, each activity is susceptible to disruption by a neighbouring state, which may dispute the location of a boundary and deploy their navy or coast guard to enforce their claim. Given the broad definition of the maritime domain, maritime boundaries may also affect the extent to which another state can lay claim to an area of the sea, the airspace above and the seabed below.

States that extend their boundaries as permitted by UNCLOS, expect to take advantage of natural resources located within their maritime domain and to develop extractive industries in this domain. An extension of boundaries increases both a state's perception of its national importance and the threats posed by neighbouring states or foreign actors, such as fishing fleets that may try and take advantage of the state's lack of presence within its maritime domain.

The growing interest by states to define boundaries and maritime domains is frequently complicated by analyses and reports circulated through the media and social networks. Often these contain inflammatory and antagonistic rhetoric.[19] However, such reports do often contribute to a process whereby boundaries become increasingly securitised as observers and stakeholders demand greater attention to and investment in a state's capacity to protect, monitor, deter and act against various maritime interlopers, including migrants and criminals. But this process is often insufficiently accompanied by bilateral or multilateral dialogue, and discussion regarding the adequacy of existing and envisioned institutions, resolution mechanisms and frameworks.

For instance, the SADC tribunal, which could have resolved maritime boundary disputes over Lake Malawi, became defunct as a result of Zimbabwean political developments precisely when it was most needed. The tribunal has only recently been resuscitated with a limited mandate. Even so, Malawi and Tanzania may still be unwilling to bring the dispute to the tribunal's official attention.[20] A general reluctance to engage local resolution mechanisms can be widely observed and it is apparent that states rely upon the arbitration and adjudication facilities provided by international courts and tribunals, in particular the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). [21] Even in circumstances where capable regional tribunals exist, states do not have the necessary trust in their impartiality. Ideally, the ICJ should be approached only as a last resort, and only once all other available African options have been exhausted.

2050 AIMS refers to two key institutions involved in the resolution of boundary disputes.[22] The first is ITLOS, which is a part of UNCLOS, and the second is the African Union Border Programme (AUBP). The ICJ is not mentioned. The AU created the AUBP in 2008 and gave it a mandate to support the peaceful resolution of disputes and thus comprises one of the core pillars of the programme. [23] The AUBP has published an informative guide to boundary resolution, as well as undertaking other vital work, but maritime disputes over boundaries on internal waters, as well as resolutions for external boundary disputes, cannot be handled either in the present or a suggested UNCLOS framework.[24]

Building boundary resolution capacity

Even though the technical issues are complicated, boundary disputes can be resolved. Involved are political considerations, economic interests and other factors. Political issues and economic interests can be destabilising, especially if they are perceived to be irreconcilable. Political interest is not only the cause of state intransigence over boundaries, but is also the major determinant for initiating, conducting and accepting decisions as regards the location of boundaries. While a disputed maritime boundary can be a source of insecurity and conflict, it can also become an area of cooperation. The resolution of maritime boundary disputes does come at the cost of time and resources, which in turn can inhibit the promulgation of alternative African mechanisms.

This is, however, not the case for disputes on international boundaries on African lakes.[25] Resolution in these instances would be aided by the development, or their strengthening where they already exist, of multilateral lake-specific regimes, lake commissions such as the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) and institutions for governance such as regional tribunals, or the creation of bilateral treaties. While institutions listed would have an inherently managerial or scientific basis, they may constitute arenas in which cooperative activity can be encouraged and sustained.

The process of resolving disputes amicably is tough and a discussion of the aspects involved is beyond the scope of this brief. What is undisputed though, is that it is political will that will determine the resolution of a dispute. Once a decision has been reached, the settled boundaries will create sites of development. The decisions taken need to be balanced with the broader political objectives of political and economic integration outlined in documents such as 2050 AIMS and the various maritime strategies of the five African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Actually, it is unclear how integration could proceed without first clarifying the location of boundaries and resolving disputes.

The political issues between states need to be addressed and, if necessary, discussion should be exhaustive within African forums. There are no models as such, but there are lessons to be drawn from disputes, especially the sovereignty dispute over the Bakassi peninsula. This dispute indicated that there must be space for involving international mediators: it was observed that Nigeria and Cameroon became more amenable to ICJ arbitration, in part because of the interest shown by the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.[26]

The preferred way of determining or adjusting maritime boundaries is to submit to a technical review.[27] Subsequent technical issues are not easily resolved. Watermarks and rivers shift location, making the determination of a final and permanent location difficult. Colonial history may make a decision unpalatable. Technical issues thus pose significant but surmountable obstacle to determining undisputed maritime boundaries and establishing peaceful relations.

A final option explored in both theory and practice is the implementation of alternatives that offer work-around concepts or, at best, transcend the boundary debate. These alternatives depend upon cooperation and a sharing or pooling of sovereignty. Proponents of this line of thought seek to reduce conflict and create mutual prosperity through the relevant parties pooling their sovereignty rather than disputing territory. Provisional means of overcoming disputes exist, such as Joint Development Zones (JDZ). A good example of this is between São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria. [28]This relatively novel concept has also found expression in 2050 AIMS as the Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA).

However, in the long-term, the alternatives are unrealisable without proper boundary delineation or the creation of JDZs, which may be prevented from coming to fruition by long-lasting disputes that could decrease the willingness of states to cooperate. While new concepts of sovereignty are being developed or explored in international law to overcome the basic sovereignty dilemma, the ideas discussed above remain tentative, underutilised and in need of further research and opportunity to assess their applicability and implementation.

Conclusion and recommendations

Underlying African maritime boundary issues, if left unresolved, could have a disastrous effect on efforts to create maritime security and the development of particular countries. Resolving disputes has political and economic repercussions for the states involved and may, ultimately, have a great impact upon regional cooperation, collaboration and moves towards integration as outlined in documents such as 2050 AIMS and the AU Agenda 2063. There are many technical and political challenges to resolving disputes. Delimitation improves overall maritime security by removing sources of international dispute, and in so doing removing an otherwise significant impediment to regional integration.

States are now seeking regional solutions in line with a continental vision focused on developing a 'blue economy' based upon a common or integrated sovereignty. They are unlikely to achieve this ambitious objective without first delineating maritime boundaries. Apart from this, the mismatch between political priorities and goals as provided for in strategies and policy documents, and the institutional capacity, resources, time and political will required to determine cases in a legal, legitimate and acceptable manner must be removed.

Future efforts to resolve disputes, either through existing frameworks or by developing new adjudication mechanisms, need to take cognisance of the fact that Africa foresees that its lakes and rivers will be part of the maritime domain. Disputes here will also require attention and arguably resolution would best be achieved within regional tribunals or lake basin commissions. Maritime boundaries at sea need to be subjected to bilateral, regional, continental or, ultimately, international adjudication.

The following recommendations should also be considered:

• African states should ensure that their claims are consistent and compliant with the relevant UNCLOS provisions concerning maritime boundaries for territorial, contiguous and EEZ waters.

• States should seek peaceful resolutions through bilateral and regional resolution mechanisms where possible, rather than internationalising disputes and seeking recourse through the ICJ before they have truly exhausted all African options.

• States must be prepared to submit their disputes to international arbitration and to accept the decisions of the arbitrators or adjudicators.

• States should both deepen and broaden their engagement with and support of the implementation process of 2050 AIMS.

• While technical impediments to the delimitation of a boundary are significant, progress towards a decision regarding the location of a boundary and the jurisdiction

and sovereignty over resources will best occur once sufficient political will has been generated at both national and regional levels.

• Stakeholders should engage in further research on and analysis of the long-term strategic objectives of 2050 AIMS, including CEMZA and JDZs. To succeed and also achieve the goals of 2050 AIMS, this requires a greater institutionalization of maritime activities and relationships, and the exploration of how best to pool and share sovereignty

Acknowledgements

Notes

[1] See the African Union Border Programme (AUBP), 2013,*Delimitation and demarcation of boundaries in Africa: general issues and case studies,*http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/27-au-border-programme-aubp (accessed 8 August 2015).

[2] F. Ikome, Africa's international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security, 2012, ISS Paper 233.

[3] Brenthurst Foundation, Maritime development in Africa: an independent specialists' framework, Discussion Paper 2010/03; M Ncube and ML Baker, Beyond pirates and drugs: Unlocking Africa's maritime potential and economic development, *African Security Review* 20(1), 2011.

[4] M S Nor, Somalia to present case at UN court in maritime spat with Kenya, 8 July 2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-08/somaliato-present-case-at-un-court-in-maritime-spat-with-kenya (accessed 1August 2015).

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[7] A Vogel, Navies versus coast guards: defining the roles of African maritime security forces, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2009, *Africa Security Brief* No. 2.

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[9] W Wekesa, Old issues and new challenges: the Migingo Island controversy and the Kenya-Uganda borderland, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4(2), 2010, 331–340.

[10] A Lalbahadur, Malawi vs Tanzania vs SADC: regional dispute resolution bites the dust, South African Institute of International Affairs, *Opinion and Analysis,* 13

August 2013, www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/malawi-vstanzania-vs-sadc-regional-dispute-resolution-bites-the-dust (accessed 11 March 2015).

[11] This could be because of their confidential nature, or because they were non-existent at the time of writing.

[12] 2050 AIMS, paragraph 18. For the 2050 AIM strategy, see http://www.AU.int/Maritime (accessed 1 August 2015).

[13] Brenthurst Foundation, Maritime development in Africa: an independent specialists' framework, Discussion Paper 2010/03; M Ncube and ML Baker, Beyond pirates and drugs: unlocking Africa's maritime potential and economic development,*African Security Review,* 20(1), 2011; U Engel, The African Union, the African peace and security architecture, and maritime security, *African Security* 7(3), 2014: 207–227; C Bueger, Piracy studies: academic responses to the return of an ancient menace,*Cooperation and Conflict* 49(3), 2014, 406–416.

[14] See page 1 of Annex B, Definitions of 2050 AIMS.

[15] PM Wambua, Enhancing regional maritime cooperation in Africa: the planned end state, *African Security Review,* 18(3), 2009: 45–59.

[16] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 15, http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.un.org%2Fdepts%2Flos%2Fconvention_agreements%2Ftexts%2Funclos%2Fun-clos_e.pdf&ei=lU5XVLulL5TcauaWgsgO&usg=AFQjCNEIbPwVYkXZEoDCYvidOjPyhLyfNw&sig2=VMYy16PlpxgTZTVSl-damw&bvm=bv.78677474,d.d2s (accessed 1 August 2015).

[17] Ibid., Article 74.

[18] As long as a ship does not present a risk to the state through whose waters it is transiting/making passage, that state may not interfere with its passage.

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[20] A Lalbahadur, Malawi vs. Tanzania vs. SADC: regional dispute resolution bites the dust, 2013, South African Institute of International Affairs, *Opinion and Analysis.*http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/malawi-vstanzania-vs-sadc-regional-dispute-resolution-bites-the-dust (accessed 2 August 2015).

[21] The ICJ was established as part of the UN subsequent to the Second World War. Its cases are not limited to determining boundaries. Its prominence in African security discussions has often been in reference to boundary dispute resolution.

[22] See 2050 AIMS, paragraphs 58 and 59, 22.

[23] See AUBP, 2013, *Delimitation and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa.*

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[26] F Ikome, *Africa's international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security,* 2012, Institute of Security Studies Paper 233.

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[28] RS de Soares, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*. 217.

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http://www.isn.ethz.ch/

Why terrorists fail: It's in the thin line between them and guerrillas - Shabaab, Boko, ISIS listen up

06 NOV 2015

According to studies, the success rate of terror groups in achieving their political objectives is 4-7%. So why do terrorists bother?

Tunisia was the target of two major terror attacks this year, the gunmen killed 38 tourists on a beach in Sousse in June. (Photo/ File)

THIS week has seen a resurgence of terror groups in Africa, after a lull of several weeks.

Over the weekend, al-Shabaab in Somalia killed at least 12 people in a raid on a hotel in Mogadishu popular with government employees, members of parliament and businessmen. The militants are said to have packed a vehicle full of explosives and rammed their way into the heavily fortified hotel compound.

In Egypt, investigators are still trying to piece together what exactly happened when an airliner carrying 224 people crashed in the Sinai peninsula, killing everyone on board. Authorities still say it is too early to conclusively determine the cause of the crash, but it looks like an explosive device may have been on board, causing the aircraft to split apart mid-air.

The Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL or Da'esh) continues to claim responsibility for the attack, the most recent statement from the group has them challenging sceptics to prove otherwise. IS has a foothold in parts of Libya, where lawlessness in much of the country has given an opportunity for the group to establish a base there.

And in Nigeria, terror group Boko Haram has released photos apparently showing a

rocket-making factory in north-eastern Nigeria, the BBC reports.

The group has used rocket-propelled grenades in the past and the photos seem to indicate that members of the group have the technical know-how to manufacture weapons; an inscription on one of the machines shows the abbreviation of Government Technical College Bama (GTCB). Bama is a town in the northeastern state of Borno that has repeatedly been overrun by Boko Haram.

These three incidents in the space of a week suggest that terror groups in Africa are far from being defeated – Boko Haram pledged allegiance to IS last year, when the Iraq and Syria-based terror group emerged as the baddest jihadists of them all, at least for now.

Reports from Somalia suggest a rift growing within in al-Shabaab, with one faction wanting to pledge allegiance to IS, while the other wants to remain affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Notoriety
Even as terror groups in Africa resurge and re-energise themselves – partly feeding off the notoriety of IS – history suggests that they are ultimately doomed to fail. The success rate of terrorism as a political strategy is dismal, studies suggest.

In 2006, an article by Max Abrahms titled 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work', analysed the political plight of 28 terrorist organisations, as designated by the U.S. State Department. His analysis found that their success rate was about 7%.

A larger study by scholars Seth Jones and Martin Libicki looking at a larger sample – 648 groups identified in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, active from 1968-2006 – found only 4% obtained their political demands.

In fact, the vast majority of terror organisations have perpetrated terrorism for decades without any real signs of political progress.

Moreover, the successful groups used terrorism only as a secondary tactic. Although non-state actors are known to employ a hybrid of asymmetric tactics, all of the politically successful terrorist organisations directed their violence against military targets, not civilian ones.

So why do terrorist groups continue with a strategy that has such an abysmal success rate?

One theory is that terrorists are irrational, unhinged, brainwashed people, who simply want to cause mayhem and destruction. But again, the science contradicts this view.

Cognitively   normal
Numerous researchers concur that terrorists do not typically exhibit mental illness or psychopathy, and seldom do they have "an emotional disturbance that prevents them from differentiating between reality and imagination." Psychological assessments of terrorists indicate they are cognitively normal (outside their use of terrorist tactics).

The puzzle of terrorism is that despite the presumed rationality of the perpetrators, this mode of violence does not seem to advance the group's given political cause.

Scholars Max Abrahms and Karolina Lula suggest that the reason for this is that terrorist leaders overestimate the odds of victory by drawing false analogies from successful guerrilla campaigns, which are indeed comparatively profitable.

The distinction is important to make – terrorism, as understood today, is the violent action of armed groups primarily on civilian targets, while guerrilla attacks focus on military targets.

The golden age of guerrilla movements was just after World War II, when national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and the Middle East achieved independence for their countries despite their military inferiority.

The National Liberation Front (known by its French initials FNL) in Algeria managed to kick the French out by a series of assymetrical attacks; the Portuguese in Africa were drained financially and exhausted militarily by the relentless attacks of guerrilla fighters in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

And in Kenya, though the Mau Mau fighters technically lost the war, the burden on British finances in retaliation campaigns made it just too costly to hold on to the Kenya Colony.

Humiliated
In the 1980s, the mujahideen resistant fighters in Afghanistan put up a sustained insurgency against the Soviet forces that had invaded the country, bleeding them so badly that the Soviets were forced to withdraw in 1989.

In 1993, the Americans were humiliated in Somalia in the infamous Black Hawk Down incident and scurried away; more recently, assymetrical attacks by Hezbollah in Lebanon against the Israel Defense Forces compelled them to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000.

Abrahms argues that terror groups today mistakenly conflate these guerrilla victories with their own chances of success, without making the distinction between civilian targets and military ones.

But killing civilians does the complete opposite of what it is intended to – it dramatically reduces the chances of a target government making political concessions, and instead increases the appeal of hard-line, right wing politics, particularly if the group is looking to achieve "maximalist" demands – a battle over values, ideology and beliefs, as opposed to limited demands over territory.

The reason for this is that the human psyche is wired for correlation and inference: if darkness is falling and someone lights a candle, I will infer that the person wants some light in the room.

Similarly, the immediate horror of the terror attack, including the death of innocent people, mass fear and anxiety, and erosion of civil liberties, makes civilians believe that this is the ultimate objective of the terror group.

Former US President George W. Bush said it many times, that any group that deliberately attacks American civilians was *evidently* motivated by the desire to destroy American society and its democratic values (emphasis mine).

Political   jujitsu
In actual fact, terrorism is an assymetrical strategy in which the perpetrator's actual target (civilians) isn't their real target (a government or political system); the terrorist is trying to provoke an excessive reaction from their real target, in so doing turn the target's strength against itself in a form of political jujitsu, as brilliantly articulated by David Fromkin in his 1975 essay 'The Strategy of Terrorism', published in Foreign Affairs.

But it doesn't work because target countries see the horrifying negative consequences of terrorist attacks on their societies and political systems as evidence that the terrorists want them destroyed, and that understandably makes them dig in and refuse to negotiate, when the actual goal of the terrorist group could be to protest foreign aggression or poverty.

So what do African terror groups want? Al-Shabaab is fighting to overthrow the internationally recognised government in Somalia, and has also stated that they want all foreign armies out of Somalia, and ultimately to establish an Islamic state.

Boko Haram wants to establish shariah law over northern Nigeria and to establish a caliphate. IS has already declared a caliphate, has massacred "apostate" Muslims, and wants to essentially bring about a return to the golden age of Islam.

All these are maximalist goals, but history has taught us that the more maximalist the demands of a terror group, the less likely that they will be achieved, because people do not make concessions when you threaten the core of their existence – their values, beliefs and ideology, particularly if they have government machinery in their corner.

They fight back.

http://mgafrica.com/article/

Conflict trends in Africa: a turn for the better in 2015?

4 November 2015

Last year was Africa's deadliest since 1999 with fatalities, which have steadily risen since 2011, reaching a peak. No wonder there was a sense of despondency during the sixth annual retreat of African mediators that the African Union (AU) organised in Windhoek in late October.

In 2014, the number of fatalities from political violence in Africa reached levels last seen during the final stages of the Cold War. During that time the number of armed conflicts in Africa fluctuated at unprecedented levels, and were much higher than we have seen in recent years. Eventually the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of proxy wars on African soil ushered in a peace dividend that continues to benefit current generations – even after the surge in violence from 2011 to 2014.

Despite the increase, much of Africa is generally at peace. The extraordinarily high levels of fatalities occur in a handful of countries, and it skews an analysis of current levels of violence. If we exclude fatalities from just five of Africa's 54 countries (Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya), fatality levels resulting from political violence remain constant at low levels that are unprecedented by historical standards.

In fact, fatalities in a number of countries, including Angola, Burundi (until recently), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and elsewhere have steadily declined over time. But news of steadily declining armed violence seldom makes the front page.

Africa is much less violent than at

the end of the Cold War

TWEET THIS

Similarly, a closer look at terrorism in Africa presents an interesting picture, where the number of terrorism-related incidents has remained constant over several decades, despite the rise in fatalities in Nigeria and Somalia. This means that more people are being killed in 2014 and 2015, but the number of events remains the same.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram has become far more deadly and effective, but in 2015 this has in part been due to the increased use of remote bombs and suicide attacks, rather than armed attacks.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab is on the back foot and steadily being pushed back by the AU and United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. The high fatalities recorded there is therefore largely a reflection of the pressure that the African Union Mission to Somaliahas been able to exert, rather than an advance by the terrorists.

Things are slowly improving in 2015, although many challenges remain, particularly as regards the future of Libya and the war in South Sudan. According to the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED), 194 800 deaths occurred in 2014 due to political violence. Recent data from ACLED, for January to October this year, indicates signs of the surge in fatalities being reversed.

By September 2015, the number of monthly incidents of political violence declined by a quarter, and the number of fatalities by more than half since the start of the year. After 1989, the burden of fatalities due to political violence was steadily declining. If recent trends continue, Africa should see a resumption of this decrease.

It is important to emphasise that although a small number of African countries are more violent today than they were 10 years ago, Africa as a whole is much less violent now than at the end of the Cold War. Instability is increasingly limited to a small number of countries. This remains true even after we factor in the impact of population growth, since larger numbers of people result in higher absolute incidents of violence.

There are many reasons for the recent increase in instability such as the fall-out from the Arab Spring in North Africa, violent infection from Syria and Iraq, the turbulence that accompanies democratisation and the associated elections, and, of course, terrorism in countries such as Nigeria and Somalia. Africa is violent because it has a young population, many of them without jobs and frustrated by their poor prospects.

In a globalised world, the sense of relative deprivation among Africa's large young population is heightened by constant exposure, especially via the media, to the wealth of others, including in their own country. Although growth rates have improved and we forecast average growth of around 6% for Africa over the long term, the short-term prospects are far less robust. Much faster growth is required if the continent is to move towards key targets, such as eradication of extreme poverty.

Work done by the African Futures and Innovation team at the Institute for Security Studies suggests that managing Africa's urban spaces will become particularly difficult in the future. Rapid development is often a tense process as people move to urban areas, traditional land rights are challenged and smart entrepreneurs (and companies) abuse the rights of others. This is particularly true where governance is weak, corruption levels high and accountability systems underdeveloped.

Africans are steadily shaping

their own destiny

TWEET THIS

For many, the narrative of Africa rising has therefore given way to a more cautious tale of Africa improving, but that large sections are being left behind, including in more affluent societies. High levels of inequality serve as an additional drag on inclusive growth and job creation, and contribute to heightening tensions.

The situation would have been much worse had it not been for the efforts at peacekeeping, conflict prevention and mediation by the AU and the UN. It seems to have become de rigueur to dismiss the efforts of the UN and castigate the AU for its apparent failures.

Yet, unlike before, African mediators are now at the forefront of making peace. Africa provides the bulk of peacekeepers on the continent, increasingly also contributing financially. Challenges remain, most prominently the extent to which the continent is unable to fund peacekeeping in Africa and its inability to make fully operational the African Standby Force, particularly its rapid response component.

A previous *ISS Today* by Peter Fabricius also pointed to the lack of consistency in combating impunity at leadership level within the AU, with different standards being applied to different situations. The AU is struggling, particularly in holding Africa's crop of geriatric leaders to account; those who cling to power in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, not to speak of the situation in Swaziland where claims of hereditary tradition trumps the will of the people.

These are all countries where instability is certain to accompany the unfolding of democracy, as it may in other countries such as the DRC, where Laurent Kabila has been emboldened by events in Burundi and is intent on extending his rule.

Yet these anomalies often obscure the broader trend, which is towards higher levels of growth, greater levels of accountability, reductions in instability and steady progress towards democracy. In line with global trends, Africans today have higher standards of living, suffer from less conflict, live longer and are healthier than ever before. While some still revel in the external blame game, singling out colonialism, France and the United States of America for particular attention (the United Kingdom has shrunk its global role to the extent that it of little consequence in Africa), the reality is that Africans are steadily shaping their own destiny.

Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies

https://www.issafrica.org/

In Egypt, angry talk of Western conspiracy over plane crash

2015-11-10

File: AFP

Cairo - Egyptian media have reacted with fury as Britain and the United States increasingly point to a bomb as the cause of the October 31 Russian plane crash in Sinai, and many have hammered home to the public here the message that the country is facing a Western conspiracy to scare off tourists and destroy the econo-

my.

The warnings of a plot have been widely promoted by opinion-makers in print, online, and on TV, sometimes hinting and sometimes saying flat-out that the West has restricted flights to Egypt not purely out of safety concerns for its citizens but because it wants to undermine the country or prevent President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi from making Egypt too strong.

"The people defy the conspiracy — Egypt will not cave in to pressures," the state-owned Al-Gomhuria newspaper proclaimed in a front-page headline this week. "Egypt stands up to 'the West's terrorism,'" an independent daily, El-Watan, head-lined.

The rhetoric reflects in part the deep reluctance in the press to level serious criticism or suggestion of shortcomings by Sisi's government.

Government and independent media alike have constantly lionised al-Sisi and depicted him as Egypt's saviour ever since — as head of the military — he led the army's 2013 ouster of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi after massive protests against Morsi and the power of his Muslim Brotherhood. Since Sisi's election as president the following year, most media have continued to laud him as working to bring stability.

'Foreign hands'

"Denial on behalf of the state that there is a crisis and then trying to point to some kind of third party is very normal" in Egypt, Hebatalla Taha, an Egypt-focused analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told The Associated Press.

Conspiracy theories often run rampant in the Middle East for a variety of reasons — poor education, suspicion of others, a lack of government transparency, limitations on speech, and the historical fact that powers inside and outside the region do often work behind the scenes to sway events and conflicts. Often, the theories are politically fuelled.

Taha said the rhetoric is the "standard fallback" for the state. Private citizens, she said, likely wouldn't have come up with the conspiracy theories on their own, "but they're very likely to adopt what state media is saying."

Egypt's media often point to "foreign hands" amid crises. During the 2011 uprising that eventually toppled Hosni Mubarak, state papers accused foreigners of fomenting protests.

Over the past two years, commentators have often accused the US of supporting the Brotherhood, which has been declared a terrorist organisation, and trying to impose it on Egypt, in response to Western criticism of Morsi's ouster by the military and the subsequent crackdown on Islamists. They also complain that the West is not helping Egypt enough in its fight against terrorism, including the Islamic State's branch in Sinai, which claimed to have downed the plane.

Multiple bombings and killings

But Taha said the reaction on the plane is also rooted in fear. The October 31 crash of the Russian jet just after taking off from the Sinai beach resort of Sharm el-Sheikh could wreck the slow revival of Egypt's vital tourism industry after five years of turmoil — particularly after Russia and Britain suspended tourism flights, demanding better airport security.

Egyptian authorities have said they are looking at all possible scenarios in the October 31 crash. They say speculation should stop until the conclusion of the investigation, which Sisi has said could take months. They have bristled at what they call a rush to judgment by British and US officials, who say intelligence suggests the IS branch in Sinai planted a bomb on the Metrojet plane, causing it to break apart in the air, killing all 224 on board.

Since Morsi's ouster, the militants have waged a stepped-up insurgency in Sinai and have carried out multiple bombings and killings of police and soldiers in Cairo. Egypt's military has been battling them in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula.

In the Egyptian media, the flight suspensions and calls for better airport security were seen as unfair and malicious.

Even if the cause was a bomb, "it doesn't require an instant and large-scale punishment and criminal defamation against Egypt", wrote the editor-in-chief of the Al-Maqal newspaper and one of Egypt's most prominent TV commentators, Ibrahim Eissa.

Political agreement

British Prime Minister David Cameron has gotten the brunt of the criticism.

Some saw it as particularly insulting that Britain's suspension of flights last week came the same day Sisi began his first official trip to London and that Cameron said at a press conference with Sisi that it was "more like than not" that a bomb downed the plane.

Other commentators went further, hinting at some sort of collusion or at least a mutual interest between Britain and ISIS.

Hazem Moneim, a commentator with El-Watan, wrote that the West was "afraid" of Egypt.

"Why would Britain issue this statement coinciding with the beginning of Sisi's visit, as if they know the truth from its source?" he wrote on Saturday. He compared it to a TV drama in which "the evil side contributes to committing the crime, then accuses the other side."

In the same paper, Lamis Gaber wrote that London "was very pleased" with the ISIS claim of responsibility. "As long as the English and (ISIS) are in political agreement and ideological and strategic harmony, then perhaps the information might be true," she wrote.

Moscow's decision Friday to suspend its flights as well threw some of the conspiracy theories into confusion, since Russian President Vladimir Putin is always depicted as a strong supporter of Sisi.

'We want to go home'

"Even you, Putin?" the newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm's front page proclaimed. Others speculated that Russia was a victim of British pressure and manipulation.

In the largest state newspaper, Al-Ahram, Taha Abdel-Aleem wrote that British and Americans statements on the crash were part of pressure "aiming to empower the Brotherhood and humiliate Egypt, as well as turn public opinion in Russia against its war on terror in Syria" — referring to Moscow's air campaign there.

One well-known Egyptian actor even said on a TV talk show that the British prime minister — whom he identified as "John Brown," perhaps muddling the names of previous Prime Ministers John Major and Gordon Brown — "is in the Muslim Brotherhood."

Al-Ahram and other papers also accused Britain of forcing its nationals vacationing in Egypt to leave.

Al-Ahram ran a photo of a woman arguing with British Ambassador John Casson at the Sharm el-Sheikh airport, with the caption, "We want to resume our trip and don't want to leave," as if she were saying that.

In video footage that has gone viral online, the tourist, Clara Dublin, was in fact telling the ambassador, "We want to go home," angry over the confusion in arranging flights out.

http://www.news24.com/

THE PAPER | Radicalisation to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: a Political Socialisation Perspective

11/13/2015

By Anneli Botha

Abstract

Africa is increasingly being classified as the new battleground against terrorism. Yet, despite this renewed interest, countries on the continent have been experiencing manifestations of this threat already for several decades. Similar to most countries in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Europe, countries on the African continent focus on addressing the symptoms and not the cause of terrorism. In addressing the manifestations of terrorism, countries directly affected by acts of terrorism predominantly adopted a security-centric approach in an attempt to bring an end to the violence. Although this might be effective in the short term, in the majority of cases, a security-centric approach has proven to be ineffective and often even counterproductive. Realising this, several scholars—and, since 2006, also the United Nations in its Global Counterterrorism Strategy—have called for addressing the underlying reasons, or conditions conducive to terrorism. Despite this positive shift in focus, governments on the African continent continue to refer to outdated lessons learned from other countries, mostly on other continents, when formulating their own counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. Learning from the experiences of others is necessary, yet foreign CT lessons often tend to be broad and general and, as a result, ineffective. Policy makers and practitioners tend to fall into the trap of framing counter strategies on what are assumed to be the underlying driving factors instead of actually conducting empirical research into the 'real reasons'. It is from this premise that interviews were conducted with 285 individuals and family members associated with al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in Kenya and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda in an attempt to find empirical evidence to support or discard what are perceived to be the root causes of recruitment into these four militant organisations. The resulting doctoral dissertation has as its most important lesson: countering and preventing terrorism should start with looking at the 'who' in addition to asking 'why'.

This article is a summary of the main research findings capturing the personal backgrounds of respondents representing the four organisations. Specific reference will be made to early childhood, the school and friends as socialisation agents in establishing ethnic and religious identity. The analysis concludes by describing the influence of these factors on radicalisation associated with external—most notably, economic, educational and political—circumstances in identifying the most critical factor driving radicalisation.

Image Attribute: al-Shabaab Child Soldier / Source: Wikimedia Commons

Keywords: Terrorism, Root Causes, Africa, Radicalization, Kenya, Uganda Lord's Resistance Army, Allied Democratic Forces, Al-Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council

Introduction

When exploring why young people turn to political violence, researchers have for many years emphasised the importance of external circumstances that provide the conditions conducive to terrorism. Although these are important, my own personal experience led me to the realisation that much more should be taken into consideration. During field research in 2003 that included discussions with victims of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) – the forerunners of al-Qa'eda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – an Algerian mother approached me and asked why one of her sons had joined the GIA while the other became a police officer. That was the moment it dawned on me that most scholars tend to oversimplify processes of radicalisation and recruitment by focussing exclusively on the external environment, without acknowledging the role the individual plays in this process. Why do young people, when confronted with the same circumstances, growing up in the same household, decide on two very different career paths in their lives?

Understanding radicalisation and recruitment from a political science perspective without including political psychology is clearly insufficient. I was definitely not the first researcher to be confronted with the reasons why and how individuals decide on a particular political position and participate in either legitimate or illegitimate political activities. While a number of factors play a role in the radicalisation process, political socialisation provides important insights into an individual's increasing involvement in radical causes. John Horgan and Max Taylor best described the nexus between socialisation and radicalisation: "What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most in-

volvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behaviour."[1] Peter Neumann probably provided the least complex description when he explained that the term 'radicalisation' referred loosely to "what goes on before the bomb goes off."[2]

Radicalisation, however, involves both external circumstances – referring to domestic and international circumstances, as presented in the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy – and internal, or personal, factors. The latter also relate to the interpretation of the external environment and can be influenced by psychological considerations that refer directly to political socialisation. In addition to a number of studies that concentrate on broad contributing factors or external circumstances, there is a need to go one step further to understand the internal dynamics leading to individuals taking that final decision to commit an act of terror, or to become involved in an organisation and/or operation that will resort to such a tactic.

Before getting into the role political socialisation plays in understanding radicalisation and recruitment, the majority of research has (until recently) almost exclusively focused on the radicalisation process on both internal (personal) and external (environmental) circumstances as these can be found among young people in the Middle East and Europe. In addition to this limited geographical focus, the majority of publications have dealt particularly with Islamist extremist organisations that resorted to terrorism as a tactic. Consequently, authorities on the African continent generally refer to initiatives implemented in the Middle East and Europe to counter radicalisation in order to inform their own counter strategies. More recently, a specific need has been identified to understand radicalisation from a political socialisation perspective in such a manner that it can also assist policy makers and practitioners in their counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives.

Defining Socialisation and Radicalisation

Historically, political socialisation as a theory served as a bridge between psychology (the individual) and the person's political behaviour after borrowing from anthropology, psychology and sociology. More important, political socialisation differentiates between the different agents, or role-players, involved in moulding a person to become a 'political animal'–a term first introduced by Aristotle.

According to Dawson and Prewitt, socialisation referred to: "… the process by which children, born with an enormous potential for different types of behaviour, come to adopt the specific standards of their own society... [Therefore] political socialization is the developmental process through which the citizen matures politically. The citizen acquires a complex set of beliefs, feelings and information which help him comprehend, evaluate and relate to the political world around him. His political views are a part of his more general social views … related to his religious, economic and cultural views".[3] Providing a more practical description, Dowse and Hughes explained that this process came down to: "… what the individual learns, when it is learned, how it is learned, and the personal consequences of this process."[4]

Socialisation and, per implication, political socialisation, is interpreted as a lifelong process through which a person develops a unique frame of reference that guides individual choices. An individual's frame of reference can be defined as the 'glasses' through which he/she sees or perceives the world around him or her. This frame of reference also includes a person's views on politics and religion, developed through a similar process as his/her views on a specific political party or ideology. Ultimately, the political self is made, not born, to include "feelings of nationalism, patriotism, or tribal loyalty; identification with particular partisan factions or groups; attitudes and evaluations of specific political issues and personalities; knowledge regarding political structures and procedures; and a self-image of rights, responsibilities, and position in the political world."[5]

Lewis Froman (1961) proposed three variables that influenced the process of political socialisation: the environment (agents of socialisation), personality and politically relevant behaviour.[6]

Conditions Conducive to Terrorism and Radicalisation

Before creating the impression that external circumstances do not play an equally important role in the radicalisation process, it is important to recognise that for radicalisation to occur the individual still needs to make sense of external circumstances he/she is confronted with. The forming of perceptions is an interwoven process, influenced by the individual's background (personality) and identity; it cannot be separated from external circumstances. In other words, every person forms mental images of the world, which are needed to provide an understanding of the world around him or her. From these 'images', stereotypes emerge that will impact on how individuals interact or react to the 'other'.

The difficulty with this process is that perceptions are being formed of the 'other' that is based on insufficient information, dis-information and often also a lack of education. Not only will both sides – us and them – drift apart, but the potential for conflict increases. Martha Crenshaw noted that: "The actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories."[7] Religion and ethnicity are powerful influences on the formation of a person's identity. In addition to the role these play as facilitators of social cohesion, an organisation – such as a religious organisation – in itself can become central to a person's identity.

Returning to external circumstances (which are being interpreted by the individual), the United Nations, in its Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), identified what it termed 'conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism'. These circumstances included, but were not limited to, prolonged unresolved conflicts; the dehumanisation of victims of terrorism; the absence of rule of law and violations of human rights; ethnic, national and religious discrimination; political exclusion; socioeconomic marginalisation; and lack of good governance.[8]

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

The following discussion summarises some of the findings of the author's recent dissertation, *Radicalisation to Commit Terrorism from a Political Socialisation Perspective in Kenya and Uganda*. This research found support for the notion that polit-

ical socialisation is a continuous process, where early lessons influence a person's predispositions. Insights framed by several well-known theories, starting with the symbolic interaction school of thought on political socialisation, explain that the individual is a product of a socialisation process. Additionally, the thesis profited from the cognitive, or developmental, school of thought, in particular Jean Piaget's and Lawrence Kohlberg's explanation that political socialisation occurs in stages. For this reason, the study did not take as its starting point the moment when a person joined a militant organization. Rather, it also focused on early childhood, school, friends, and the formation of ethnic and religious identity of the militants. One of the central questions that this study addressed was the role economic circumstances play in conflict, reflecting the class struggle theory of Karl Marx.

However, pluralist theory contributed the most to this study through the focus it places on asking a series of questions: (a) who (b) learns what (c) from whom (d) under what circumstances and (e) with what effects? Through these questions, the effect of external (macro) factors on the individual throw a new light on the debate regarding the relative weight of 'push' and 'pull' factors in the radicalisation process.

Three of the four organisations referred to in this study base their ideology on religion, both Christianity with reference to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Islam with reference to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, commonly referred to as al-Shabaab or 'The Youth'. However, ethnicity is an equally important factor in the radicalisation process, leading to the inclusion of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) as a multi-religious organisation driven by regional secession (not based on one single religious or ethnic cause) from the rest of Kenya. In order to understand the 'who', 'why' and 'how' individuals were radicalised, 285 interviews were conducted with members of these four organisations and the families of al-Shabaab members who had been killed or incarcerated, or who had disappeared in Kenya.

Contrary to most other studies on the root causes or conditions conducive to terrorism, this study instead focused exclusively on the immediate period before and after radicalisation. In interviews with current and former members of the ADF, LRA, al-Shabaab and MRC, respondents were asked a series of questions going back as far as their early family life in assessing whether a link exists between a person's early childhood development—when identity—and perception-formation occurs—and later susceptibility to radicalisation.

While a political socialisation perspective might not be a new theoretical framework for analysing the making of militants and terrorists, such an explanation of participation in terrorist organisations in East Africa is new. The dissertation was the first study that used biographic profiles of individuals associated with terrorism in Kenya and Uganda in an attempt to understand susceptibility to extremism and radicalisation.

Although a basic understanding of relevant conditions provides insight into radicalisation processes, it is important to realise that a combination of factors is often present and that this combination will differ from person to person. Furthermore, not all people confronted with the same set of circumstances will be radicalised, and not all of those radicalised will eventually commit acts of terrorism. Central to this process

is the role individual characteristics play in linking the world to that individual's interpretation of the external environment and the outcome of the political socialisation process in the form of identity formation and subsequent radicalisation.

Political Socialisation Agents and Radicalisation

Although personality itself plays a critical role in how an individual interprets the world – which was one theme of the larger dissertation study – the present article will not focus on findings related to personality types. Instead, here the focus will be on the role primary (family, friends, school) and secondary socialisation agents (e.g. media) play in the radicalisation process.

The **family** plays an essential role (whether positive or negative) throughout any person's life, but especially in the period between infancy and the moment a child reaches school-going age. The family is deemed to be the first step in the transmission of fundamental values. Considering the extensive influence of family in political socialisation, a number of questions were asked to test family impact on the respondents interviewed, in order to determine whether the family indeed played a major role in the radicalisation process. Starting with the socialisation process, the bond (or lack thereof) between parent and child plays an extremely important role in developing a person's self-esteem and identity. In other words, if there is not a strong bond between parent and child in early life, the chances that a person will carry over certain positive values and lessons to later life will be limited. Simple questions, such as whether the respondent's parents were aware of their decision to join the organisation, or whether their parents supported this decision, served to explore this level of trust. For example, only 6% of ADF and 11% of al-Shabaab respondents informed their parents of their decision to join the organisation. These figures was higher among MRC (24%) and LRA (26%) respondents, who said that they had informed their parents about their joining the organisation. When asked if their parents supported this decision, 3% of ADF, 21% of al-Shabaab, 24% of LRA and 59% of MRC respondents answered in the affirmative. One possible explanation for these differences relates to the history of these organisations and what they represent. Joining a banned group, such as al-Shabaab and the ADF, brought its own risks and might explain why parents were not informed. In contrast, following a parent's footsteps to take over the mantle in fighting for the rights of especially an ethnic or geography-based group, might explain a person's willingness to inform parents of his/her decision with members of the LRA and MRC. Families tend to establish the foundation in transferring political antagonisms, loyalties and viewpoints from one generation to another. In order to assess the extent of parents' active political involvement, respondents were asked whether their parents discussed politics with them when they were growing up. The parents of respondents in Uganda were considerably less politically active than those in Kenya: less than half (41% of ADF and 44% of LRA parents) discussed politics with their children. In contrast, 68% of al-Shabaab and 78% of MRC parents discussed politics with their children. Based on such findings, one can assume that primary political socialisation through parents – as an agent – was greater in Kenya than Uganda.

In assessing the relationship between an absent parent and joining a terrorist organisation, the results of this study regarding an absent father figure were very similar to those that J. Post had found in his study of 250 West German terrorists (from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement). In that particular study, 25% had lost

one or both parents by age 14, while 79% did not have a positive family relationship – in fact, 33% had a particularly hostile relationship with their fathers. [9] Many respondents among the ADF (44%), LRA (38%), al-Shabaab (18%) and MRC (31%) had grown up without a father figure. However, the majority of respondents who joined these organisations did grow up with a father figure present. This is not to say that experiencing abandonment or a lack of belonging will not contribute to make a young person susceptible to seek another father figure, or enhance the need to belong to a group to experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. What is important to realise is that these feelings can be experienced even in situations where both parents are present.

At a certain age, the school and peers take over from parents as the primary political socialisation agent. Although parents still play a role, depending on the young person's relationship with his or her parents, going to **school** introduces a completely new environment. Through interaction with other groups – most notably religious and ethnic or tribal groups – the person will develop new or enforce existing perceptions of the 'other'. For this particular reason respondents were asked whether they had contact with 'others' (particular attention was paid to whether ethnicity or religion was the core of the group the person joined), and whether they had friends from the 'other' side while growing up. When asked whether they had contact with people from other religious backgrounds, 100% of MRC, 97% of ADF, 88% of al-Shabaab and 88% of LRA respondents answered in the affirmative. Some 100% of MRC, 97% of ADF, 96 of al-Shabaab and 85% of LRA respondents said that they had had contact with other ethnic groups. Considering that the majority of respondents attended public school, having contact is, however, very different from having friends from other ethnic or religious groups, especially when the 'other' is later categorised as the enemy. For example, although 88% of al-Shabaab and 97% of ADF respondents had contact with other religions, al-Shabaab respondents in particular indicated that only a small minority formed close friendships with Christians. The latter example speaks to the development of subgroups based on racial, religious, ethnic and social class, as presented by Dawson and Prewitt.[10] Through such subgroups, students establish their own school segregation system that prevents members of their respective group from having meaningful contacts with others. Through these subgroups and subsequent limited interaction, the positive influences of attending a mixed school are lost.

Segregation at school occurred naturally, presenting a very unique trend, as 27% of ADF respondents attended Christian schools while being Muslim, while 30% of ADF and 25% of al-Shabaab respondents attended Islamic schools. Similarly, attending school with other ethnic groups in the coastal region of Kenya or northern Uganda did not imply that respondents were in close contact with ethnic groups they classified as the enemy. Rather, the presence of minority ethnic groups tended to confirm the 'us' against 'them' paradigm. In other words, the political socialisation process continued and although respondents might have had contact with 'others,' these group images had most probably been built on perceptions of the 'other' that were already established by their parents.

Friends, another primary socialisation agent, played a central role throughout the study in introducing respondents to the organisation, being informed of their (i.e. the respondents') decision to join, or even joining the organisation with the respondents. Friends introduced 66% of MRC, 38% of al-Shabaab,

35% of ADF and 31% of LRA respondents to the organisation. Although the last three organisations reflected a percentage below 50%, it is important to note that friends still represented the biggest single role-player in terms of being informed of the respondent's decision to join. No fewer than 34% of al-Shabaab, 33% of MRC, 21% of LRA and 15% of ADF respondents informed a friend of his/her decision to join the organisation. Again, friends made up a very important group: 82% of MRC, 71% of al-Shabaab, 58% of ADF and 40% of LRA respondents joined their respective organisations with friends. In contrast, only 25% of LRA, 15% of ADF, 7% of MRC and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents joined their respective organisations with family members.

Respondents also indicated that they recruited other friends to the organisation: 60% of MRC, 54% of al-Shabaab, 23% of ADF and 12% of LRA did so while 36% of MRC, 13% of al-Shabaab, 11% of ADF and 0% of LRA respondents recruited other family members. As a result, friends made up one of the most important political socialisation agents of this study, followed by religious leaders, in the case of al-Shabaab.

Secondary socialisation agents are equally important in the political socialisation process. Specific reference was made to the **media**, which can serve as a 'front' to indoctrinate and radicalise susceptible individuals. Evidence of this was seen particularly in the dedicated communication strategy employed by both al-Shabaab and the MRC. They were using Internet-based channels such as blogs, Twitter and video and/or audio recordings to reach and indoctrinate potential and existing members. Considering the time spent and the relevancy of messages, susceptible individuals changed their opinions to mirror those of the orator. The study found an inability and oversight of governments to use the media to build national unity and identity following independence. Instead, it was found that the media was often used as a platform to transmit divides, especially during elections, and to harness political support based on religious and/or ethnic division.

Becoming a radical often involves a **role model** whom a new member can look up to in teaching him or her how to act. This person plays an important role in instilling the values that the group represents and to think and act for the collective, thereby serving as another political socialisation agent. Religious scholars and other leaders played an important role in the 'collective conditioning' or indoctrination process of new members. For example, 34% of al-Shabaab and 29% of ADF respondents were introduced to the respective organisations through a religious figure. In addition, 26% of al-Shabaab respondents informed a religious leader of their decision to join the organisation. This was the second biggest group, after a friend, to be informed of respondents' decision to join the organisation among al-Shabaab respondents. This brings us to other active role players who introduced respondents to the mentioned organisations. As detailed earlier, 66% of MRC, 38% of al-Shabaab, 35% of ADF and 31% of LRA respondents were introduced by a friend, while a relative introduced 27% of LRA, 19% of ADF, 7% of MRC and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents. Additionally, the group itself approached 11% of the recruits of the LRA, 7% of both the ADF and MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents. It is important to note that 31% of LRA, 21% of al-Shabaab, 20% of MRC and 5% of ADF respondents joined these organisations on their own and without the introduction of an intermediary.

Identity and Radicalisation

The study further shed light on the role an absent national identity feeling plays in increasing the prominence of sub-national identities – based on religion and/or ethnic principles – which can be transferred from one generation to the next. This is in line with the theory presented by Robert LeVine, who found in 1963 that during the independence processes in many African countries, people were more loyal to local tribes and local government units than to the newly established nation states.[11] Since 1963, neither Kenya nor Uganda has been able to establish an inclusive national identity – beyond the brief moments of patriotism when the national team wins a football match. Although the majority of African scholars place the blame on colonialism, the inability of such countries to establish a national identity after half a century of independence reflects rather poorly on the post-colonial leadership.

Instead of building a new political culture, leaders sporadically drew on their own ethnic or religious identity, encouraging a new cycle of identity-based politics, either by ethnic or religious association. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that the core of the ADF, LRA, MRC and al-Shabaab are still relying on ethnic and religious identity. Consequently, al-Shabaab and ADF respondents identified with their religious identity, whereas MRC and LRA respondents identified with their ethnic and geographic identity. However, joining these respective organisations was not only a means for the respondents to express their social identity, but also served as a vehicle to fight for their respective in-groups. To assess this particular aspect two inter-related factors need to be present: firstly, religious or ethnic identity needs to be important, and secondly, there needs to be a perceived threat to this identity.

Starting with the importance of religion to al-Shabaab and ADF respondents, 59% of al-Shabaab and 56% of ADF categorised their religion (Islam) as most important, followed by 37% of al-Shabaab and 30% of ADF respondents who classified it as very important, while the remaining 14% of ADF and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents still indicated that their religion was important. Although all four organisations included respondents who had converted from one religion to another, the impact of conversion was analysed more closely in organisations such as the ADF and al-Shabaab, where religious identity was paramount. Although evidence exists – especially amongst al-Shabaab respondents – that individuals who were converted and radicalised by radical religious leaders were more vulnerable, only 9% of al-Shabaab respondents interviewed had converted before joining.

It is, however, important to note that the period between converting and joining differs considerably, as only 42% of this group converted to Islam up to a year before joining al-Shabaab. In other words, the majority (58%) had converted up to six years before joining the organisation. Those who had converted within a year before joining were most likely converted by a radical religious scholar. This indicates that reaching the same conclusion for the majority of respondents who converted is problematic. The conversion rate amongst ADF respondents was higher, with 22% of respondents interviewed having converted before joining the organisation. Among these respondents, 50% had converted within the year before joining, with some even indicating that they had converted and joined at the same time. Political socialisation – even among those who had converted over a longer period – changed through the individual's interaction with others whom he or she did not have close associations with. Whether this change in political socialisation agent had an impact

on the radicalisation process, can be seen more accurately in those cases where conversion and radicalisation happened simultaneously or one soon followed the other, as with many ADF respondents.

Beyond determining that religion is important to al-Shabaab and ADF respondents, their threat perception also needed to be analysed: 97% of al-Shabaab and 77% of ADF respondents considered their religion to be under threat. Regarding the type of threat, 60% of al-Shabaab and 35% of ADF respondents classified it as a physical threat, whereas 46% of ADF and 34% of al-Shabaab respondents categorised it as an ideological threat. The remaining 19% of ADF and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents considered the threat to be both physical and ideological.

However, if there is a threat, there must be an enemy to complete the 'us' and 'them' equation, or, to put it differently, to establish in- and out-groups. Respondents were asked to indicate who was behind this threat. In response to this question, 58% of ADF and 49% of al-Shabaab respondents identified their respective governments, while 20% of ADF and 18% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that the enemy was external. Some 24% of al-Shabaab and 11% of ADF respondents identified another religion (Christianity) as being behind the threat, while 11% of ADF and 9% of al-Shabaab considered this threat to be a combination of their government and other countries or religions.

In terms of the importance of ethnicity, 23% of LRA and 18% of MRC respondents classified their ethnicity as most important, 69% of LRA and 68% of al-Shabaab respondents categorised it as very important, while the remaining 13% of al-Shabaab and 8% LRA respondents considered ethnicity as important. It is, however, worth noting that – in contrast to religious classifications – neither MRC nor LRA respondents represented a single ethnic group. Instead, they represented and referred to a number of ethnic groups within a specific geographic area. Similar to the ADF and al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government (with respect to the MRC) and Ugandan government (the LRA) were identified as the primary enemy, followed by specific ethnic groups. In contrast to the findings on religion, the MRC and LRA did not refer to an external enemy.

From this, it would appear that social identity based on religion and ethnicity had been transformed into an organisational identity. In other words, the respective organisations purported to represent the interest of the religious and ethnic identity groups. Members of all four groups consist of individuals who were drawn to other members of an in-group (based on religious or ethnic affiliation) that stood together against an out-group. Although the in-group was based on religious or ethnic affiliation, the majority of respondents referred to the organisation when asked to identify 'us': 84% of both MRC and LRA respondents, 68% of al-Shabaab and 59% of ADF respondents. Additionally, a further 36% of ADF and 32% of al-Shabaab respondents also referred to their religion. With reference to their ethnic group, 14% of MRC combined organisational members with ethnicity, while a further 4% of LRA and 2% of MRC respondents categorised 'us' as members of their ethnic group, and/or people from their geographic area.

When asked to identify 'them,' answers varied from references to government to other religious to ethnic groups and other countries. For 92% of LRA, 79% of ADF, 52% of MRC and 30% of al-Shabaab respondents, their respective governments

were classified as 'them'. For 67% of al-Shabaab and 16% of ADF respondents, 'they' were identified as other religious groups, while only 5% of ADF and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to other countries. With reference to ethnicity, 43% of MRC and 4% of LRA respondents referred to other ethnic groups as 'them'. Despite these different answers, 'they' was used to refer to the strongest manifestation of 'the enemy' in the mind of each respondent.

For all respondents, social identity was paramount in influencing the person's drive to join a particular organisation. In both the ADF and al-Shabaab, religion – in this case Islam – was central to the identity of each respondent. In contrast, MRC and LRA respondents referred to minority ethnic groups marginalised by those in power.

For in- and out-groups to be in conflict with each other, a real or at least perceived threat needs to exist, as explained earlier. Due to political marginalisation or economically caused, relative deprivation, political power and access to resources served as the capital that in- and out-groups competed for. The individual must also attach meaning to the particular situation for him or her to respond (through the group). The study further confirmed that smaller groups, whether religious or ethnic, established stronger in-group identification, experiencing the need to protect themselves against larger out-groups. For example, Islam is the minority religion in both Kenya and Uganda, while it serves as the social identity marker for both al-Shabaab and the ADF. Although the MRC and LRA are multi-ethnic in their composition, both groups attract members from smaller ethnic groups in very specific geographic locations where others present a threat. In all four groups, the government, through its security forces, represented the 'other' who was behind the threat. This study also confirms the observation made by Hector Avalos that religious conflicts are seldom only about religion. Instead, it is often about national territory, political leadership and other matters, framed within a religious context. [12]

Emotions – anger, contempt, guilt, fear, hatred and revenge or vengeance – emerged through the interviews as another component needed in the radicalisation process. Respondents were asked whether anything had happened that influenced their decision to get involved or join the organisation. Based on the answers given, a large number of respondents referred to instances of injustice against members of their in-group, based on religious and ethnic identity. This supports the finding of Martha Crenshaw, who identified vengeance as the most central emotion common to both individuals and groups in driving them to acts of terrorism.[13] This refers in particular to the desire to avenge not oneself but others, directed at those held responsible for injustices.

The six emotions named above are all driven by subjective perceptions and interpretations of instances of injustice or discrimination. These injustices were predominantly based on political circumstances, associated with the way in which security agents dealt with a particular situation that involved members of the in-group. This supports a finding of Horgan, who noted that individual experiences of victimisation from security forces were of key importance.[14]

When assessing the role of **frustration** in joining and being a member of the organisations, discussed throughout the study, respondents were asked to rate their frustration levels at the time of joining. Some 88% of LRA, 49% of ADF, 48% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC respondents rated their frustration between 8 and 10 (the

highest tier); 54% of MRC, 48% of al-Shabaab, 19% of ADF and 12% of LRA respondents rated their frustration levels between 5 and 7 (second tier); while only 32% of ADF, 13% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents placed their frustration between 1 and 4 (the lowest tier). Frustration cannot exist in isolation; a reason is required. Two of the most prominent reasons – threats to religion and ethnicity – were already referred to above. Respondents were also asked to specifically identify the reason for joining the organisation. Firstly, referring to religion, 87% of al-Shabaab and 54% of ADF respondents referred only to threats to their religion as the main reason for joining. An additional 6% of al-Shabaab and 2% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and economic reasons, and a further 6% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and political motives. Secondly, with reference to ethnicity, 25% of MRC and 19% of LRA respondents referred only to perceived threats against their ethnic group. It is important to remember that although a further 58% of LRA respondents gave personal reasons, the majority of these personal reasons could be categorised as ethnic in nature. Additionally, 14% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons, and a further 2% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of religious and political reasons. The remaining two reasons were political and economic.

Religious scholars and other leaders played an important role in the 'collective conditioning' or indoctrination process of its members. For example, 34% of al-Shabaab and 29% of ADF respondents were introduced to the respective organisations through a religious figure. Additionally, 26% of al-Shabaab respondents had informed a religious leader of their decision to join the organisation. This was the second biggest group, after the friend category, when it came to letting others know about their decision to join the organisation among al-Shabaab respondents. It is, however, important to note that 31% of LRA, 21% of al-Shabaab, 20% of MRC and 5% of ADF respondents joined these organisations on their own and without the introduction of another role player.

External Circumstances and Radicalisation

Considering the interplay between friendship and personality type, McIntyre and Platania found that young people with insecure identities, driven by idealism, were particularly vulnerable to adherence to an ideology and/or participation in an ideological group.[15] The **age** of most respondents confirmed the vulnerability of adolescents and young adults and the risk of groupthink among friends: 40% of LRA, 19% of ADF, 17% of al-Shabaab and 7% of MRC respondents joined between the ages of 15 and 19; 45% of MRC, 35% of al-Shabaab, 24% of ADF and 20% of LRA respondents joined between the ages of 20 and 24; 28% of ADF, 25% of MRC, 21% of al-Shabaab and 12% of LRA respondents joined between the ages of 25 and 29; 20% of al-Shabaab, 15% of ADF, 14% of MRC and 12% of LRA respondents joined between 30 and 34 years of age; 8% of LRA, and 2% of MRC and 1% of ADF and al-Shabaab respectively joined between 35 and 39 years of age. The most vulnerable period identified in this study was between 20 and 34. Despite similarities, it is also clear that each organisation had a unique age profile. The most dramatic of these is the LRA, which presented a younger profile, with 40% joining between the ages 15-19 while the MRC manifested a somewhat older profile: none of its respondents represented the 10–14 age group, and only 7% fell in the 15–19 age group.

Radicalisation is a gradual process – which makes it very difficult to define exactly when it occurs. When respondents were asked to provide the duration of time between first introduction and actually joining the organisation, members of all groups interviewed – with the exception of al-Shabaab – referred to an overall period of more than six months between first introduction and actually joining the organisation.

One of the more widespread allegations – that **poverty** is a cause of terrorism – was disproven by this study. Without denying that poor economic circumstances can make a person more susceptible to recruitment, it must be noted that only a small minority – 13% of ADF, 12% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents – specifically referred to dire economic circumstances as a reason why they joined the organisation. As mentioned above, a further 6% of al-Shabaab and 2% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and economic reasons, while an additional 14% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons.

Respondents who mentioned economic circumstances specifically referred to situations where increased economic disparities occur within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups. Members of the MRC in Kenya were most prominent in referring to disparities between the economic circumstances of coastal people and those in other parts of the country, but they also referred to discrimination experienced in comparison to outsiders living in 'their' region. This is an example of how relative deprivation can become a political issue and the resulting frustration a driving factor for radicalisation. Therefore, monitoring socio-economic trends in preventing radicalisation will be especially useful where there are economic disparities within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups. Indicators that will be particularly useful are rates of population growth, degree of access to public service, uneven development, urbanisation and uneven unemployment and education opportunities – especially if these are linked to religious, ethnic or other relevant categories. These factors are likely to contribute not only to social conflict but also to a community's vulnerability to radicalisation.

Education is one of the most important factors to be taken into consideration in preventing future radicalisation. Although the role of schools was already mentioned as a socialisation agent, education is the only way through which better career opportunities and upward social mobility can be achieved – countering perceptions of relative deprivation. The higher someone's level of education, the more likely that person will participate in conventional politics. When a person is better informed and has a better understanding of his/her role within the political process, he or she has the ability to express political opinions and has a greater stake in the political process. It was found that the inability of respondents to stay in school and enhance their level of education was one of the most central factors that made them susceptible or vulnerable to later radicalisation. The majority of respondents – 79% of LRA, 67% of MRC, 66% of ADF and 47% of al-Shabaab – only had a primary school education, whereas 45% of al-Shabaab, 26% of ADF, 24% of MRC and 21% of LRA respondents had reached secondary school.

At the other end of the spectrum, a very small minority of respondents – only 9% of MRC and 8% of al-Shabaab – indicated that they had received tertiary education. Not having sufficient education severely limited employment opportunities beyond low-paying, unskilled jobs. Those who studied further were predominantly drawn to religious studies, especially Islamic studies. What is particularly interesting is that students were not required to finish school before becoming an imam or a religious teacher – some respondents only had a primary school education. In other words, madrasas and the more secular schooling system run on two very different criteria. The consequences are far reaching, as it correlates directly to the quality of education received by individuals who only attend religious schools, especially madrasas. Without questioning a person's ability to be a good follower of his or her particular religion, it must be debated how someone – placed in a position of authority – can guide others without the ability to understand disciplines other than theology. This is particularly significant when it happens at a time in a young person's life when he or she should develop an ability to think critically. This is not to question the place for religious education; however, instructors should also have the necessary credentials to teach students about other disciplines.

The findings above support those of Berrebi, who explained that when education was religious it might encourage radical thought while only marginally increasing productive opportunities in the labour market.[16] Consequently, although such individuals might consider themselves as educated, they might not be able to do much with the education they received. This again contributes to perceptions of relative deprivation and supports the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Educated individuals are less likely to refer to violence to correct real or perceived injustices (which cause frustration) since education enhances self-confidence and assertiveness. In other words, better education and encouraging young people to stay in school is the best strategy against relative deprivation, but then everyone ought to have the same opportunities, and career advancement and social mobility should be based on merit – not on any other criteria.

Conclusion

Preventing and combating terrorism should start with understanding what drives an individual to resort to terrorism, taking into consideration the reality that not all people experience the same external circumstances – not even people growing up in the same household. In order to understand radicalisation, this study asked the question to what extent political socialisation explains the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations in Kenya and Uganda. Is there a difference in the applicable factors between the divergent ideological frameworks of the Allied Democratic Forces and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, and al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya?

This study found that political socialisation—starting with the family, and expanded through peers, school, media, and earlier political experiences, and ending with the terrorist group—played a distinctive role in each of the four organisations. In addition to the differences, which create a distinctive profile for each organisation, the study also noted remarkable similarities, starting with personality types, position in the family and education (or the lack thereof). With this in mind, how can law enforcement and social organisations be guided to identify and reach individuals at risk? The process of answering this question starts with calling on governments and

their security forces to understand the uniqueness of each militant organisation. In other words, to copy and paste counterterrorism strategies from one country to another is likely to be ineffective if not downright counterproductive. The only inclusive finding across organisations and between countries has to do with the way in which countries and their security forces respond to these organisations. Indiscriminate repression provokes feelings of revenge and contributes to terrorist recruitment. Strategies based on ethnic and religious profiling, mass arrests and torture proved extremely counterproductive. In line with this, the study found that both Kenya and Uganda have been unable to establish an inclusive national identity. Instead, religious and ethnic identity drives perceptions of political exclusion and feelings of relative deprivation.

One of the key findings of this study is that only a very small minority is driven purely by poor economic circumstances. A core influence among individuals being radicalised relates to the fact that people lose their trust in politicians and the political system, while anger and frustration are directed at security agencies that are viewed as agents protecting the current regime at any cost. As a result, instead of preventing and combating terrorism, their repressive approaches ensure that young people affected by them – and even other family members – are radicalised. The prevention of unconventional political participation should therefore start with creating a political landscape in which people, especially those being marginalised, can express themselves freely. In addition, it must be stressed that the legitimacy of the political process can only be ensured when the political playing field is perceived as being free and fair. Therefore, the legitimacy of the government, the measures security agencies implement to respond to threats of terrorism, and the enhanced individual potential for unconventional political participation are interlinked. Finally, the study also found that education is a key factor in ensuring legitimate participation in the political process and the most effective strategy to prevent perceptions of relative deprivation.

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Terrorisme : Le terrain oublié des réseaux sociaux

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Au Mali où nous ne sommes encore qu'aux balbutiements de la révolution internet, les réseaux sociaux s'installent de plus en plus dans notre quotidien. Un fait salutaire en principe au regard des potentialités que regorgent ces outils.

Cependant, il y a un danger particulier dont l'ampleur pourrait être exacerbée par ces nouveaux moyens de communication et de socialisation.

De nos jours, internet devient de plus en plus incontournable dans nos habitudes. Ici, son utilisation grand public est très axée sur les réseaux sociaux et concerne toutes les catégories de la société, même si les jeunes constituent l'écrasante majorité d'internautes maliens. Certains adolescents passent même davantage de temps à naviguer à travers l'univers virtuel qu'à s'investir dans des activités traditionnelles de leur tranche d'âge.

La tendance des jeunes maliens à s'approprier des outils comme Facebook ou Twitter présente des avantages inestimables pour notre pays. Malheureusement, cela peut également être une aubaine pour les filières terroristes qui peuvent facilement manipuler les esprits vulnérables du lot. Dans ce monde où l'anonymat est un garanti absolu, quoi de plus facile que d'entrer en contact avec un individu en manque de repère pour l'orienter dans la direction souhaitée.

Les terroristes du 21ᵉ siècle ont bien compris que c'est là également que se joue leur avenir.

La toile est infestée par les fous de la terreur.

Ceci est autant une réalité dans les pays occidentaux densément connectés qu'en Afrique. En Europe, par exemple, où tout est mis en œuvre dans le domaine du renseignement pour empêcher que des groupuscules physiques ne voient le jour sur leur territoire, les cellules terroristes passent par le web pour recruter la plupart de

leurs bombes humaines occidentales envoyées en Syrie ou en Irak.

Le péril djihadiste au Mali est en train de s'estomper grâce l'accompagnement dont bénéficie le pays. Les formations reçues par les forces armées de défense et de sécurité leur permettent désormais de mieux prévenir les actions terroristes. Cet facteur, ajouté à la présence des forces étrangères (Barkhane et la MINUSMA) au Mali, sabote considérablement les entreprises terroristes et empêche la constitution de groupuscules terroristes physiques.

Certes. Mais l'évolution prévisible va concerner internet, notamment les réseaux sociaux qui vont bientôt servir, comme en Occident, de lieu privilégié à la diffusion des messages de propagande et au recrutement de bombes humaines. Les prémices sont déjà là et sont perceptibles dans la communication des groupes terroristes.

La pénétration d'internet dans notre pays comme partout en Afrique s'est accompagnée d'une floraison d'activités répréhensibles dont le terrain favori est les réseaux sociaux. De nos jours, nombreux sont les jeunes qui tombent naïvement dans les pièges des cyber-escrocs. La misère et l'absence de perspectives conditionnent certainement la plupart de ces gens à croire à la première opportunité, aussi invraisemblable qu'elle puisse paraitre.

Dans un pays où la pauvreté chronique pousse des milliers de bras valides à risquer leur vie dans la traversée périlleuse de la Méditerranée à la recherche d'un avenir plus radieux pour leur famille, il ne fait aucun doute que les fous de la terreur, avec leurs billets d'argent, ne manqueront pas de public à convaincre au Mali.

Alors, vigilance !

- See more at: http://maliactu.net

Mali : Après la paix, comment réussir la réconciliation ?

5 novembre 2015

La réconciliation nationale au Mali passera par deux grands défis qu'il faudra relever : la manifestation de la vérité et la justice pour toutes les victimes. Quel chemin pour réussir cette réconciliation tant souhaitée ?

La paix véritable dans un pays qui sort d'un grave conflit armé requiert des préalables sans lesquels on aura beau signé des pactes d'entente, la fin des hostilités ne sera que précaire. Un long processus de réconciliation est primordial pour le retour définitif de la paix. Cette réconciliation des cœurs et des esprits ne peut s'obtenir que par l'établissement de la vérité sur des faits foncièrement salis par les propagandes et idées reçues.

La réconciliation envisagée par les maliens est à l'image de la crise en passe d'être résolue définitivement. Il s'agit en effet de pouvoir trouver des pansements appropriées pour des plaies qui, jamais soignées, ont continué à s'infecter pendant des dizaines d'années. Remonter aux origines d'une crise qui date des premières années de l'indépendance du Mali, telle est l'ambition que l'on nourrit.

De 1963 à nos jours, toutes les vérités sur les exactions et leurs auteurs doivent être déterminées. Les nombreuses victimes des rebellions successives au nord du Mali qui sont dans l'attente depuis des lustres sont impatientes que leur voix soit entendue et que leurs bourreaux soient punis. Sans doute une goutte d'eau dans l'océan de barbaries des groupes armés du nord, les bavures commises par l'Etat malien, à travers l'armée nationale, vont également être mises sur la place publique.

En attendant que ces finalités visées par le plan de réconciliation ne soient traduites dans les faits, le débat actuel réside surtout sur la capacité des mécanismes de justice transitionnelle mises en place pour y parvenir.

Les bonnes intentions et les limites de la CVJR

Au Mali, pour réussir la réconciliation, le choix a été porté sur un model standard de mécanisme de justice transitionnelle : la Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation (CVJR). Créée le 15 janvier 2015, la CVJR est chargée de missions aussi épineuses et délicates comme de mener des enquêtes sur les cas de violations graves des droits de l'homme commises dans le pays ; ou encore d'établir la vérité et de situer les responsabilités sur ces violations et les atteintes aux biens culturels. Le tout couronné par l'élaboration d'une série de recommandations qu'elle soumettra aux plus hautes autorités du pays.

Nommé le 17 aout dernier pour présider la CVJR, le choix sur Ousmane Oumarou Sidibé, un ancien ministre appartenant au principal parti politique de l'opposition (URD), n'a pas suscité de réactions de rejet notables. Tout le contraire de la désignation, le 14 octobre, des autres membres de la commission, parmi lesquels figurent des personnalités très contestées par l'opinion publique.

Les associations de défense des droits de l'homme fustigent la nomination de certains individus proches des groupes armés. Toute chose qui vient planer un doute sur l'intégrité des membres de la CVJR dont les nominations n'ont été consécutives à aucune concertation préalable de la société civile.

La justice, noyau central pour mettre fin à un cycle de violences armées souvent motivées par la vengeance

Depuis les premières rebellions au nord du Mali, les violences armées sont devenues cycliques dans cette partie du pays. La crise actuelle prend ses sources dans les blessures non soignées du passé. Des plaies causées par l'injustice qui a toujours été l'apanage des différentes rebellions et répressions qui s'en sont suivies. La présente crise s'est d'ailleurs illustrée par une montée en puissance des groupes d'autodéfense formés les populations civiles qui n'entendaient plus subir les massacres des rebelles.

Si malgré les réserves fondées des défenseurs des droits de l'homme, la CVJR arrive par miracle à produire un travail objectif il reste toujours cet autre challenge, la justice, à réussir. La justice pour toutes les victimes doit être rendue. Un pari qui n'est pas gagné mais qui est incontournable pour rompre avec les cycles de violences armés au nord du Mali.

Cette justice doit notamment résister à deux facteurs majeurs : l'extraction à la justice, au nom de la paix, de gros bonnets de l'ex rébellion qui seraient impliquées dans des violations des droits de l'homme et la réticence de l'armée à livrer ses éléments soupçonnés de crimes.

Car la CVJR est un maillon essentiel de la réconciliation nationale reconnu dans l'accord de paix, ses conclusions et recommandations doivent être acceptés par tous les acteurs. Il incombe particulièrement aux autorités de s'assurer de la traduction de tous les auteurs présumés de crimes devant les tribunaux compétents. Un regard bienveillant doit enfin être porté sur la réparation des dommages et l'indemnisation des victimes.

http://maliactu.net/

Comprendre le syndrome malien et y apporter des solutions définitives

Ferloo.com – Il a fallu que l'ancienne puissance coloniale prenne la tête d'une coalition ouest-africaine pour repousser la nébuleuse de séparatistes, d'extrémistes et de narcotrafiquants qui menaçait de détruire l'Etat malien et transformer ce territoire en un « lion famélique », selon l'image proposée dans l'étude prospective sur les futurs possibles de l'Afrique en 2025.

Ainsi, cette intervention décisive, il faut le dire, menée au nom de la liberté et de la défense de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté du Mali est en soi l'expression de l'échec historique des élites politiques africaines, illustre les limites des institutions africaines et consacre en même temps l'affaissement de l'Etat post-colonial. Cette crise engage d'abord la responsabilité de l'élite dirigeante du Mali, et pose la nécessité du renouvellement des élites politiques dans un monde où la compétition pour l'accès aux ressources naturelles et aux marchés est plus féroce que jamais. Aussi, notre propos cherchera-t-il à mettre en relief quelques unes des causes de cette faillite des élites africaines, qu'on nommera pour les besoins de l'analyse, le « syndrome malien ». Ensuite, nous proposerons, comme solution inspirée du Responsabilisme, une nouvelle architecture politique et institutionnelle pour l'espace de la CEDEAO.

I – LE SYNDROME MALIEN

1.1 La trappe clientéliste explique l'absence de réflexion stratégique

Les élites politiques africaines accordent peu d'intérêt à la réflexion stratégique. En lieu et place, les luttes intestines pour le contrôle du pouvoir d'Etat et des ressources publiques, ainsi que les arrangements, compromissions et reniements supposés iné-

vitables dans cette voie, ont fini, dans la plupart des cas, par tenir lieu de principe d'action à l'élite rentière. On assiste à une course éhontée aux postes et aux rentes pour s'enrichir et entretenir une clientèle politique de plus en plus pauvre. Le clientélisme politique n'épargne pas non plus les confréries, au mépris des enseignements éthiques des maîtres fondateurs de ces voies soufies. En effet, la classe politique a besoin des ressources publiques pour entretenir sa clientèle. Seule la corruption peut lui permettre d'obtenir ces ressources. Celle-ci prive nos pays des investissements nécessaires à la croissance, à la satisfaction des besoins essentiels des populations en favorisant une consommation excessive de l'élite et une sortie des capitaux, ce qui accentue la pauvreté. Les pauvres s'accrochent aux clientèles politiques dans un réflexe de survie pour espérer obtenir des transferts ponctuels. Il faut alors plus de ressources pour entretenir les clientèles et donc plus de corruption. Ainsi se crée un cercle vicieux qui sape les bases institutionnelles de nos pays.

Piégés dans des logiques clientélistes, les partis politiques abdiquent leur rôle d'intellectuels organiques, pour emprunter l'expression d'Antonio Gramsci, et le terrain politique cesse d'être le lieu d'expression et de confrontation d'authentiques projets de société, de courants d'idées conséquents et de visions du monde cohérentes. Les hommes politiques cessent de dire les grands récits qui donnent sens à la vie publique de la cité, autrement dit les idéologies politiques. Ce rôle est alors concédé à d'autres leaders sociaux, notamment les religieux, dont la vocation sociale, à eux assignée par le peuple, ne le leur permet pas. Le discours politique cesse d'être producteur de sens, surtout à l'endroit de la jeunesse. Ainsi, les enjeux géopolitiques qui, dans le contexte actuel de changement de siècle et d'époque, devraient occuper la centralité des analyses et des offres programmatiques des partis politiques et des gouvernements, sont très faiblement pris en charge par la classe politique de nos pays. Le temps politique, indolent, se confond alors avec le temps électoral.

Cette posture a son antithèse (ou antidote) politique : le Responsabilisme, doctrine du Mouvement Tekki, qui repose sur l'engagement primordial de l'homme sur la Terre et appelle à une mise en pratique permanente de la responsabilité des Africains vis-à-vis de l'Afrique[1]. Plus généralement, c'est la responsabilité de toute la société politique dans son ensemble qui est convoquée face à ce que l'écrivain nigérian Chika Onyeani appelle la faillite intellectuelle de nos élites.

1.2 Des institutions culturellement inadaptées

Le syndrome malien, c'est également l'échec de cinquante années d'une voie de développement politique, économique et institutionnel sans issue. Le niveau de dénuement de nos populations, surtout de sa frange jeune ainsi que l'inadéquation de nos institutions par rapport à nos réalités historiques, sociologiques et culturelles, constituent un terreau propice à l'émergence de forces de désagrégation, de formes souveraines de régulation politique et sociale qui apparaissent hors de l'Etat, ce que Achille Mbembe appelle « sortie de l'Etat » dans son étude des frontières mouvantes du continent. Les différences ethniques, raciales, religieuses, culturelles, au lieu d'apparaître comme diversités enrichissantes pour une communauté plurielle, sont érigées en facteurs de haine ou, à tout le moins, en frontières symboliques à l'intérieur de ladite communauté. A supposer d'ailleurs qu'il y ait des antagonismes de fait autour de ces différences, un Etat viable devrait pouvoir les absorber dans le jeu institutionnel et politique à travers des confrontations pacifiques. Ce qui, hélas, n'a pas été le cas hier au Soudan, aux Comores et en Somalie, ce qui n'est pas encore le cas aujourd'hui en Guinée Bissau et au Mali, et qui sait ce qu'il adviendra demain de

la RDC, du Nigéria, de la Côte d'Ivoire et de beaucoup d'autres territoires du continent ?

Assurément, de nouvelles institutions endogènes sont nécessaires pour prendre en charge ces menaces. Il s'agira de sortir du formalisme institutionnel désuet et désincarné en vigueur, héritage colonial maintenu par pur conservatisme ou mimétisme paresseux. Les réalités spécifiques à l'Afrique, à son histoire et à ses cultures devraient donner de la matière à une œuvre urgente de destruction créatrice, en maintenant et en enrichissant les valeurs universelles de la République et de la Démocratie. Par exemple, la laïcité au sens de la culture et de l'histoire françaises, prétendue forme immuable et imprescriptible de la plupart de nos Etats, est plus un dogme institutionnel qu'une réalité vivante dans nos sociétés. A l'instar de l'Amérique, du Royaume-Uni, ou même de l'Allemagne et d'autres aires géographiques, les pays africains ont le droit d'assumer leurs croyances, diverses et plurielles, comme fondement spirituel de leur culture institutionnelle. Cela contribuerait à rendre leurs institutions légitimes et populaires, donc démocratiques. Dans cette perspective, l'avènement de l'émergence citoyenne aiderait à réformer nos mœurs politiques car c'est la condition préalable à tout projet de transformation sociale durable. Comme dans les arts et les sports, le génie africain, libéré de ses carcans, saura contribuer au renouvellement d'une démocratie mondiale en crise.

1.3 Revisiter la laïcité à la « française »

La place et la portée sociale et politique de l'Islam sont souvent au centre de la controverse. Les extrémismes de tous bords alimentent les surenchères, qu'il s'agisse des islamophobes qui, en Occident, s'acharnent contre l'Islam par des moyens multiformes, et de ceux qui, dans le monde musulman, adoptent la violence pour imposer leur vision intégriste de la religion. Concernant d'ailleurs ces derniers, ils doivent bien se rendre compte qu'ils défient tout simplement le message coranique qui définit explicitement les musulmans comme une communauté éloignée des extrêmes. Le monde musulman devrait revisiter ses racines théologiques à travers le modèle vivant incarné par le Prophète (Psl), mais également son âge d'or intellectuel qui l'a vu, durant toute la période du 9ème au 13ème siècle, irradier la terre de la lumière de ses sciences, de ses arts et de ses lettres. Il importe que les musulmans prêtent plus attention à l'invite de Souleymane Bachir Diagne de réapprendre à « philosopher en Islam », en référence à cette époque et à ces lieux où la foi et la raison, réconciliées, ont su ensemble triompher des ténèbres.

1.4. S'approprier la géostratégie

La géostratégie contemporaine a comme trame de fond la course pour le contrôle des sources d'approvisionnement en matières premières, dans le contexte de l'apparition d'un nouveau régime de croissance mondiale centré autour du Pacifique et impliquant des Etats-Continents à forte démographie. Relativement à ces enjeux, les Africains doivent produire des analyses et leurs gouvernements formuler des offres de partenariat stratégique avec les divers blocs en présence, uniquement sur la base des intérêts supérieurs de notre continent. Actuellement, environ 25% des approvisionnements énergétiques des États-Unis (cette part pourrait doubler d'ici 2020) et un tiers de ceux de la Chine proviennent de l'Afrique. Les intérêts chinois et occidentaux sont perçus comme concurrents, en ce qui concerne l'accès aux ressources africaines. Des initiatives comme Africom s'inscrivent dans un dispositif américain de sauvegarde et de dissuasion à l'égard de la Chine. De la même manière, l'interven-

tion de la France dans le conflit libyen ayant abouti à la chute de Khadafi, a aussi été dictée par ses intérêts géopolitiques liés aux réserves pétrolières de ce pays. La zone sahélo-saharienne concernée par le conflit actuel est réputée notamment pour ses immenses réserves en gaz et uranium. De façon plus spécifique, l'une des explications de l'intervention urgente de la France au Mali consiste, à titre préventif, à sécuriser les mines d'uranium du Niger voisin qui assurent une production d'énergie nucléaire permettant la couverture de près du tiers des besoins énergétiques de la France.

Ce sont ces intérêts géostratégiques qui permettent de comprendre les relations entre les groupes salafistes armés et les pays occidentaux ; elles apparaissent marquées du sceau de l'ambivalence et de l'instrumentalisation. Ces groupes étaient non seulement fréquentables, mais soutenus et armés en Afghanistan lors de l'invasion soviétique. Ils ont bénéficié d'une collaboration active en Lybie pour venir à bout du régime de Khadafi. Ils sont appuyés aujourd'hui en Syrie en vue d'abattre le régime d'Assad. Ces groupes salafistes sont idéologiquement rattachés à l'Arabie Saoudite et politiquement liés à l'Etat du Qatar alors qu'il est communément admis que ces deux pays sont, dans le monde arabe, parmi les alliés les plus sûrs de l'Occident. Dans le même temps, les mêmes groupes sont férocement combattus en Afghanistan, en Somalie, au Yémen, au Pakistan ou au Mali. Durant la guerre civile algérienne des années '90, Alger avait toujours regretté la manière dont la diplomatie américaine en particulier, ménageait les GIA. En Iran, les Moudjahidines du Peuple, organisation typiquement terroriste s'il en est, sont traités avec bienveillance par les Etats-Unis, au moment où le Hamas, parti démocratiquement élu à Gaza par les populations palestiniennes, figure en bonne place sur la liste noire des organisations terroristes établie par le Département d'Etat. Tout cela pour dire que le discours produit sur « le terrorisme » ou, dans un amalgame de vocabulaire savamment entretenu « l'islamisme », s'apparente à bien des égards à celui du maccarthysme. Il a une vocation instrumentale. Le puissant dispositif médiatique qui s'occupe de la « fabrique de l'opinion » pour parler comme l'intellectuel américain Noam Chomsky, impose pour sa part les codes, les normes et les icônes constitutifs d'un prisme qui structure une vision du monde uniformisée à l'échelle du globe.

Au vu de tout ce qui précède, nous formulons des propositions de solutions inspirées du Responsabilisme. Elles visent à donner un coup d'accélérateur à l'intégration africaine pour éviter la généralisation rapide du « syndrome malien » dans la Sous Région.

II – POUR UNE NOUVELLE GOUVERNANCE REGIONALE RESPONSABLE

Etant donné les difficultés rencontrées depuis Nkrumah pour mettre en place un gouvernement continental africain, et la nécessité de plus en plus incontournable du regroupement des énergies pour faire face aux forces de désagrégation de la mondialisation dans un contexte historique où comme le rappelle le Mouvement Tekki, l'Afrique est l'enjeu du monde, de nouveaux Etats fédéraux ou confédéraux devraient voir le jour au niveau de chacune des Régions de l'Afrique. Dans la zone ouest-africaine en particulier, le moment est venu de transformer la CEDEAO en un Exécutif régional capable de suppléer les Etats nationaux post-coloniaux qui ont échoué dans la réalisation du projet indépendantiste de défense de leur souveraineté extérieure. Les contradictions à caractère identitaire, apparemment insolubles à

l'intérieur des frontières nationales, seraient également largement diluées dans ce nouvel ensemble supranational. Dès lors, il convient, le plus rapidement possible, de lui confier au moins quatre domaines de souveraineté, selon le principe de subsidiarité, de distribution optimale des compétences entre les niveaux national et régional. Il s'agit de :

- La Défense: le spectacle humiliant d'une Afrique de l'Ouest incapable de défendre ses frontières avec des armées dites nationales, ne laisse pas d'autre choix que la mise en place d'une défense communautaire. Le schéma d'armées nationales dédiées à la défense de la sécurité extérieure de l'Etat, a montré ses limites dans tous les pays ouest-africains avec l'offensive des forces terroristes au Nord du Mali ;

- La Diplomatie: une diplomatie commune, économique et de défense, capable de représenter la Région et de négocier des partenariats avec toutes les grandes puissances du monde, sur la base d'un agenda régional convenu par l'ensemble des Etats, est également une priorité ;

- Le Gouvernement économique : il s'agit d'instituer une compétence régionale sur les projets structurants d'infrastructures communes de transport, de communication, de fourniture d'énergie et d'eau, d'aménagements hydro-agricoles et de l'environnement, en vue de constituer sur l'espace régional, une base productive qui permettra de faire éclore notre potentiel industriel et agricole. Au demeurant, celui-ci doit s'appuyer sur une convergence rapide des systèmes éducatifs et de recherche scientifique;

La Monnaie: les trois champs de compétences précités définissent les contours d'une zone monétaire unique. A cet effet, il importe de passer à la monnaie régionale en évitant de transformer en fétiches les critères techniques de convergence multilatérale. L'ensemble des quatre domaines constituent le socle d'un système régional de finance avec une monnaie commune, une Banque centrale unique et des banques nationales et régionales, publiques et privées dont on a déjà des expériences réussies, tout ceci permettant enfin de prendre en charge de manière décisive la question du financement des économies, de la croissance et du développement durable.

Des initiatives régionales citoyennes et populaires sont requises pour un tel projet. En effet, la question de l'intégration régionale ne doit plus être seulement l'affaire des administrations comme la CEDEAO ou l'UEMOA, pour redevenir un sujet de débat citoyen, un projet politique majeur soumis à discussion aux populations, comme ce fut le cas à la veille des indépendances. Les jeunes leaders politiques émergents dans nos différents pays ont là, l'opportunité de reprendre le flambeau de la lutte pour le projet fédéral, avorté au moment des indépendances. Les forces vives de la société civile africaine devront prendre en charge le projet. Les formations politiques en particulier devraient transcender les frontières nationales et se regrouper en plateformes panafricaines selon leurs sensibilités idéologiques. Elles seraient alors des sections nationales de partis régionaux selon l'expérience des regroupements d'antan que constituaient le RDA, le PRA, le PAI, etc.

Consécutivement à cette étape, un Parlement ouest-africain, dont les membres seraient élus au suffrage universel, s'attacherait à légiférer dans les domaines visés plus haut. Dans les pays où la Constitution nationale n'a pas prévu pareille évolution, le débat citoyen ci-dessus cité serait l'occasion de soumettre la question au

choix des populations. In fine, il s'agira de préparer une Constitution ouest-africaine qui fixera la forme, la nature institutionnelle et les pouvoirs qui seront dévolus au nouvel Etat supranational.

Si notre génération réussit ce projet de nouvelle gouvernance régionale, elle aura créé les conditions de la paix et du développement durable en Afrique de l'Ouest et, plus généralement, dans l'ensemble du continent.

http://www.ferloo.com/

Winning the Hearts and Minds: Improving Community Relations

November 6, 2015

The elusive nature of an insurgent who is able to carry out attacks and quickly blend in with the rest of the population has made the military realize that it needs the members of the public to work alongside with them, if they are to effectively root out terrorism from the area. In recent times we have started seeing the military take several steps to improve community relations with members of the public.

The Defense HQ released pictures of 100 insurgents in a bid to solicit the help of the public in identifying and apprehending wanted insurgents. When asked about how the Army was able to compile the list, the Director of Army PR said it was through a combination of video screenshots, cross cued with eye witness accounts and a review of other evidence recovered from the raided Boko Haram camps.

The military's efforts in this endeavor must be commended. Videos of these insurgents have been in the possession of the military for years now. It appears the new dedicated leadership is working with more of a sense of purpose and focus, and has decided to utilize and implement proven counter-terrorism strategies. Having a most -wanted list or a target list, allows the military to focus on attacking the insurgent network and removing the key individuals who help keep the attacks going through facilitation of supplies, weapons, funds, fighters, IEDs and so on.

The defense PR also stated that there was no financial reward attached for those who are able to provide pertinent information about these wanted Boko Haram insurgents. It said the military is relying on individuals to act on their own accord for the good of the nation. Unfortunately, the people in the affected communities, right now do not necessarily feel a lot of appreciation in what the government has done for them, based on what they've been going through over the last couple of years.

In order for this strategy to be more effective, the military may have to assign some bounty on the insurgents on the list, as the public may be more willing to share information about their whereabouts, when there is some pecuniary gain.

Counter Propaganda and De-Radicalization Strategies

Adding to the list of other non-violent or soft handed approach being used to defeat Boko Haram, the government also unveiled a communication strategy it is implementing with the aim of countering the ideological propaganda Boko Haram had been preaching to its followers.

Dr Akilu, a renowned psychologist who worked with former Boko Haram insurgents in the de-radicalization program, explained in an interview with the BBC, that a lot of the Boko Haram members had an inadequate ability to reason logically, as they were being fed a version of religion by a charismatic preacher and simply accepted that version to be the absolute truth.

Counter propaganda strategies help in ensuring that the proper religious narrative is being given to these easily impressionable youth, so that as Dr Akilu said, "when someone says to you: 'My religion says that you should hate someone from another religion,' you can actually counter that."

Improving Troop Morale

The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Buratai, took time out to visit Nigerian Army troops on the battlefield, and boost their morale by handing out promotions and commendation medals. The COAS also stated that he was also there to get firsthand operational requirements of the Brigade and its affiliated units as well as to identify challenges facing them.

This sort of dedication to troops and to the community is all part of a multi-faceted strategy which scholars and experts have long agreed is needed in tackling the Boko Haram insurgency. In essence we are seeing the leadership not just talk about what they are going to do, but also putting the plan in action. With this sustained level of engagement, the government will be able to eventually put an end to this Boko Haram insurgency and possibly prevent future ones.

Increased Inter-agency Collaboration

There are reports that the Inspector General of Police Solomon Arase put together a joint task force comprising of personnel in the police, DSS, military and NSCDC, whose main purpose is to hunt down Boko Haram members who are attempting to flee the heavy military pressure in the North East, into other parts of Nigeria. This task force was supposedly involved in arresting about 45 terror suspects who were

planning to bomb Dolphin Estate in Lagos, and was also instrumental in the arrest of about 30 Boko Haram suspects in Nyanya, a satellite town in the FCT, where twin bomb blasts occurred on October 2, 2015.

This sort of inter-agency collaboration is precisely how the country's security agencies need to be operating in order to effectively tackle the security challenges of the nation. The threat of Boko Haram infiltrating other parts of the country is a real one and the security agencies in all the various states need to begin implementing their counter-terrorism strategies which includes active intelligence gathering, disseminating key information to the appropriate personnel and working together to prevent attacks before the occur.

Tackling Lagos State Crime

Lagos state has been focusing on improving the security situation in the state through the use of increased technology. Recently, the state governor announced plans to procure three helicopters in order to enable security agencies tackle criminal activities in the air while assisting in monitoring traffic gridlock. There were also talks of deploying drones in addition to the 1,000 CCTV surveillance cameras already mounted across Lagos. The Lagos state governor also urged the State Police Command to reassess their patrol and surveillance strategies. He encouraged increased patrol between 12 midnight and 4am, actual vehicle patrols instead of stationery vehicles.

All this renewed focus on security in Lagos state and the attempt to proffer solutions to this challenge is not unfounded as there appears to be an increase in crime incident reports. Cases of cultism related clashes, armed robbery, and kidnapping have also increased. A combination of road works and increased rainfall has contributed to unimaginable gridlock traffic which in turn has given rise to traffic related robberies. The tailgating or 'bumper to bumper' manner in which Lagosians drive makes maneuvering out of or escaping from these traffic robberies virtually impossible.

It is probable that the same gridlock traffic probably hinders response teams from gaining access to the areas where these robberies are taking place. If this is the case, would the use of a helicopter be helpful in tackling this crime in real-time? Well the answer is yes if the policemen onboard, plan on sliding down on ropes commando style directly into the middle of the area of activity and giving the robbers a good 20 minute foot chase before they are apprehended. But if this is not feasible, perhaps the use of police motorcycles will suffice. If the helicopters are going to be used to get real-time situation awareness, less intrusive and non-life threatening CCTV cameras and even perhaps unmanned aerial vehicles (or drones as they are popularly called) could perform the same function.

It is understandable that the governor wants to implement new creative ideas and technologies to manage traffic and defeat crime in Lagos, however it appears that when it comes to the streets and crime and traffic, some Lagosians still need 'in-your-face' methods of enforcement. Commercial bus drivers and okada riders will hardly fear the presence of a helicopter, drone or CCTV. To some of them, the good old presence of a no-nonsense KAI or LASTMA agent is what they need to obey the rules.

The response to crime challenges need to be two phased, the first phase should be on effectively using the law enforcement officers to prevent crime. Once this is working, the second phase can then be the implementation of strategic technologies that should serve to enhance the works already being done by the officers. Jumping straight to phase two leads to instability which makes the government appear out of touch. Given time, the use of technologies will straighten things out, but the question is do Lagosians ever have time?!

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http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/11/winning-the-hearts-and-minds-improving-community-relations/

Boko Haram's Horrifying Trend: Girls Used as Suicide Bombers

Nigeria's terror group is on course toward a grisly record for the most female suicide bombers by any terrorist group in history.

November 1 2015

Medical staff help a man who is being treated in a hospital after being injured in a bomb blast carried out by a young, female suicide bomber who detonated her explosives at a bus station in Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria June 22, 2015. The attack was blamed on Boko Haram.

STRINGER/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

 n case you were wondering, the group formerly known as Boko Haram didn't go away.

The vicious band of militant Islamists wrecking West Africa is using women and girls to stage a comeback. To date, there have been 53 female suicide bombers in 2015. "No terrorist group in history has used as many female suicide bombers as [Boko Haram] has used this year," notes Scott Stewart, analyst for geopolitical forecasting firm Stratfor.

After one historic presidential election in Nigeria, along with faint mainstream-media spotlight on #BringBackOurGirls, Boko Haram had receded into Western-world unfamiliarity. Newly minted President Muhammadu Buhari talked tough, publicly baking the Islamist insurgency group into his to-do list of national priorities. Voters, understandably eager to put the country's troubles to rest, showered him with a 70 percent **approval rating**, with 20 percent in July saying "security has improved." Buhari **obliged** with a December deadline to finish off Boko Haram.

But with fresh allegiance to the Islamic State group in Syria and a slick, long-name rebrand (they want to be called "Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi"), Boko Haram has been **hitting Nigeria hard** with an "unprecedented use" of girls as suicide bombers, according to Stratfor analysis.

"By our count, Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi has mounted more suicide bombings this year than any other jihadist group except the Islamic State core in Iraq and Syria," notes Stewart. "But whereas the Islamic State overwhelmingly uses male bombers, nearly half of Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi's bombers have been women."

The numbers are both horrifying and sobering.

Since July, there have been nearly 300 deaths caused by suspected Boko Haram suicide attacks, most in the vicinity of Maiduguri, upper-northeastern Nigeria's largest city. Additionally, more than 70 have been killed in the eastern state of Adamawa. Throughout Nigeria, 170 people have been killed in October alone, bringing the number of deaths to more than 1,400 since Buhari took office this year. Nigerian secret police even **reported** the recent arrest of 45 suspects planning large-scale bombings in Lagos, the center of the country's burgeoning economy.

But in a disturbing new development, the number of female suicide bombers has now surpassed that of male bombers, with 17 women or girls used to carry out attacks versus 14 men or boys during October throughout Nigeria and neighboring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Girls identified range in age from 9 to 15. Steep increases in the number of women or girls deployed for suicide attacks were also seen in February, June and July, months that marked the presidential election and the beginning of Buhari's administration.

Lagos-based women's activist Moyo Hicks tells *The Root* that Boko Haram actually began using female suicide bombers last year, in an attack on Gombe, Nigeria, in June 2014. Since then, Hicks has observed an uptick in the number of female suicide bombers, most of them teenagers and also some children.

"Females are better used for such attacks because they are less suspicious, and can easily conceal bombs in their burqa," says Hicks. "There were calls for the ban of the wearing of the burqa in public after it was banned in Chad following a suicide-bomb attack in N'Djamena in which the female bomber concealed the bomb in her burqa. But such bans can't be put in place in Nigeria because of the heightened religious tension and division in the country. There were some who viewed it as anti-Islam."

http://www.theroot.com/

Nigeria: Military Reforms Weaken Islamic Terrorists

November 4, 2015:

President Buhari, being a retired army officer, ordered a change in the way the military does business as soon as he came to power in March. As a former general he knew how to assess and address the current commanders and has enacted a number of military reforms. This has led to the dismissal of a lot of officers, especially in the army. One general was even jailed for incompetence, misbehavior and losing a major battle to Boko Haram. There are new training programs, which the troops appreciate as a lot of corrupt or incompetent officers did not want to be bothered in the past. While most of the new training programs have been for the army, the navy, which is taking the lead against oil thieves in the south, has done the same. Sailors often find themselves battling heavily armed gangs and appreciate training that will make them less likely to be a casualty or on the losing side. The oil facilities are mostly in the Niger River Delta, which is a maze of waterways where the oil gangs hide their operations. Because of this the navy is heavily involved. The air force also lost a lot of officers in an attempt by Buhari to end the cycle of corruption that had left most aircraft unable to fly (because funds for maintenance had been stolen). That must be working because air force manned and unmanned aircraft are more frequently seen in the sky. The air force says it has carried out nearly 1,500 air strikes in September and October. The air force also coordinates with the army so air strikes on remote Boko Haram camps are followed up with a ground attack to capture prisoners and gather intelligence.

While of all of the changes ordered by Buhari have made a difference it is clear that the long-held belief that Boko Haram would be destroyed by the end of 2015 is not going to happen. The Islamic terrorists are surviving in the bush and still managing to gain recruits. Another problem is the continued delay (for several months) in the start of an offensive against Boko Haram by an international force of troops contributed by neighboring countries. This is apparently because of disputes over how the campaign will be run. The last one, in early 2015, led to complaints that the Nigerian troops would not cooperate with the foreign troops and often acted recklessly.

Captured Boko Haram men report being told that thousands of Boko Haram men are being prepared for a major attack on Maiduguri (capital of Borno State and where Boko Haram started) but none of the prisoners actually saw a lot of Boko Haram gunmen assembled in one place. The army believes that this is all Boko Haram propaganda to improve morale among their own men. The air force and the United States have been carrying out intense aerial surveillance in Borno for over a year and can find no evidence of large Boko Haram camps and not a lot of smaller ones.

President Buhari has quietly reinstated the use of mercenaries. His predecessor had hired some foreign mercenaries in late 2014 to train and advise (lead) a task force of elite Nigerian troops to quickly crush the most determined Boko Haram resistance. While running for election Buhari condemned this move and sent the mercenaries home once he was in power. Buhari condemned the bribes that accompanied the mercenary deal but his own special operations officers reported that the mercenaries had been quite useful. This all began in late 2014 South African mercenaries were brought in. South Africa is the country where the military term "commando" was invented over a century ago and that is where these fellows can still be found. In January a South African security firm (STTEP, for Specialized Tasks, Training,

Equipment) was given a three month contract (worth nearly $4 million) to assemble a force of a hundred combat experienced trainers to help Nigeria deal with Boko Haram. The men STTEP sent consisted of whites and blacks but all were experienced (often former special operations) combat vets. A few were from outside Africa although most were South African (or from neighboring countries like Namibia). In a few weeks the STTEP force had expanded by selecting competent Nigerian troops and these few hundred men, moving quickly in trucks and a few armored vehicles as the 72nd Mobile Force Battalion, with Nigerian aircraft overhead (some with STTEP men aboard acting as spotters) quickly smashed one "troublesome" Boko Haram group after another. Boko Haram had up to ten thousand armed men in the north organized into dozens of smaller units led by charismatic men of varying military skill. The STTEP force went after the most effective Boko Haram battlegroups, which not only greatly weakened Boko Haram overall but demoralized the less competent Boko Haram leaders and gunmen. This made it easier for the troops from neighboring countries to go after the remaining Boko Haram fighters. By late February Boko Haram was weakened sufficiently for the Nigerian troops to go in and carry out the final push against the demoralized and thoroughly unnerved Boko Haram fighters. STTEP was successful but Buhari did not extend their contract and in March and the STTEP personnel left as the Nigerian Army was advancing into Boko Haram strongholds and freeing hundreds of women and children the Islamic terrorists had captured in 2014. Nigerian officials soon admitted they had used STTEP and there were few complaints because it worked. Buhari had STTEP checked out and concluded that that firm was legit and is bringing them back. Some 250 STTEP personnel will assist in upcoming offensives against Boko Haram.

Boko Haram has done an enormous amount of damage in the northeast. At their height (in early 2015) Boko Haram controlled over 25,000 square kilometers in northeast (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states) Nigeria. That was nearly three percent of Nigeria. Since then most of that area has been recaptured and Boko Haram chased from villages and urban areas. These Boko Haram have taken to living in the bush, in small groups and raiding rural villages for food and slaves. Boko Haram has long kidnapped women, girls and children and used them for labor to run their camps and carry gear. A growing number of these captives have been persuaded to be suicide bombers.

In the northeast over 300 schools have been destroyed by Boko Haram and 70 percent of children in Borno State (the worst hit) are no longer able to attend school at all. After all "Boko Haram" literally means Western education is forbidden (because it is un-Islamic and thus a cause of Nigeria's' social and economic problems). Six years of heavy fighting have left the infrastructure (roads, power supply, communications) up there a mess. Since 2009 the Boko Haram related violence has left over 17,000 dead and over two million homeless. Most of the damage was in Borno.

Boko Haram released photos on the Internet of a rocket building workshop. Analysis of the photos indicates that the equipment being used was stolen from towns and colleges that Boko Haram had occupied for a time in 2014 and 2015. Apparently the equipment was moved to a remote location where the Islamic terrorists are still able to operate. Then again it was unclear when the photos were taken but the army has not captured such a workshop yet.

November 1, 2015: In the northeast (Borno) troops found Boko Haram using an abandoned school as a camp and drove the Islamic terrorists out, killing four of

them.

October 31, 2015: Boko Haram made over twenty attacks in Borno during October, leaving nearly 200 dead and many more wounded. A number of attacks were foiled and several hundred Boko Haram were killed or captured.

October 30, 2015: In the northeast the army has been posting a large poster containing pictures of a hundred specific Boko Haram members being sought. This includes over a dozen senior leaders, some of them with large rewards offered for information.

October 27, 2015: In the northeast (Borno State) troops attacked two Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest, killed 30 of the Islamic terrorists and freed 338 women and children being held captive. There have apparently been some negotiations with Boko Haram in which the Islamic terrorists offered to free hundreds of their captives if the government would release the most skilled Boko Haram bomb maker. The government refused.

October 24, 2015: In the northeast (Maiduguri, capital of Borno State) a female suicide bomber killed three people and wounded five. There were actually two women suicide bombers but police managed to seize one before she could detonate. In another incident four female suicide bombers attempted to get into the city but were thwarted with the help of local defense militias that watched the roads into the city and acted against anyone acting suspiciously. Three of these bombers detonated and killed one militiaman and wounded nine others. The fourth suicide bomber was stopped before she could detonate.

October 23, 2015: In the northeast there were three suicide bomber attacks on mosques (two in Maiduguri and one in Yolo, capital of neighboring Adamawa State). These attacks left 55 dead and many more wounded. Boko Haram attacks mosques to intimidate Moslem clergy to preach against Islamic terrorists and Boko Haram in particular.

In central Nigeria (Jos) dozens of armed men belonging to a local Wahhabi mosque attacked a crowd of Shia celebrating a religious event. Over thirty Shia were wounded before police could intervene. The Wahhabi mosque was one of thousands founded worldwide with the assistance of Saudi cash and missionaries over the last three decades. The Wahhabi form of Islam is very hostile towards non-Moslems and Moslems who are not Wahhabi.

October 22, 2015: In the northeast (Borno State) Boko Haram attacked the town of Kerewa, which straddles the Cameroon border. By the next day Nigerian troops had cleared the Islamic terrorists out of the Nigerian side of the town while Cameroonian troops had done the same on their side.

October 20, 2015: In the northeast (Borno State) troops and local militia attacked a Boko Haram camp where a large scale attack was being prepared. The army had received tips from locals. Over a hundred Islamic terrorists were killed in the operation and 36 captured women and children were freed. Boko Haram continues to make small scale attacks in the northeast but the Islamic terrorists are so unpopular with the civilian population that the soldiers, police and self-defense militias have a steady supply of tips on what the Boko Haram is up to. Thus large scale Boko Haram attacks are now very rare.

October 18, 2015: In the northeast (Borno State) a female suicide bomber was shot dead as she tried to get into an army barracks. She was found to have explosives and a detonator in a bag she was carrying.

October 15, 2015: In the northeast (Maiduguri, capital of Borno State) two Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked a mosque leaving several dozen dead.

October 14, 2015: The U.S. agreed to send 300 troops to Cameroon to help with the fight against Boko Haram. The U.S. already has some troops in neighboring Niger, where American UAVs and manned recon aircraft operate out of a Niger air base. Apparently UAVs will also operate out of the Cameroon base, which is very close to the Nigerian border.

In central Nigeria (Kogi State) troops guarding a mosque defeated a Boko Haram attack on the place, killing two of the Islamic terrorists.

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/nigeria/articles/20151104.aspx

Tout sur l'attentat terroriste avorté de Sousse

11/11/2015

L'affaire de la tentative d'assassinat de Ridha Charfeddine président de l'Etoile Sportive du Sahel et député de Nidaa Tounes à l'Assemblée des représentants du peuple (ARP) refait surface. Elle revient à la Une de l'actualité nationale suite aux derniers coups de filet réussis par les agents des services sécuritaires tunisiens faisant état de découverte de plans terroristes touchant plusieurs personnalités dans le pays.

Tout a démarré avec les investigations effectuées par la Brigade des renseignements d'El Aouina. Les recherches ont abouti à la découverte de plusieurs ramifications terroristes, et ce grâce à des descentes menées dans une habitation à M'saken où deux individus ont été arrêtés. A l'intérieur de la maison, objet de la descente, on a saisi un matériel ayant servi aux terroristes pour mener à bien leurs opérations. Ce matériel consiste en une importante quantité d'explosifs, d'un grand nombre d'armes de divers types, des munitions et des cartouches ainsi qu'un ordinateur qui constitue, selon les premiers éléments de l'enquête, une sorte de boîte noire de toute cette affaire.

Selon les premiers éléments de l'analyse du contenu de l'ordinateur, on découvre des détails de la série d'attentats et d'assassinats planifiée. Il s'avère, effectivement, qu'un plan d'attentats à l'explosif contre des structures sécuritaires, économiques à caractère stratégique ainsi que des hôtels est planifié. Selon les mêmes plans, on projette également une série d'assassinats de plusieurs personnalités dont notamment des sportifs appartenant à l'Etoile Sportive du Sahel, des hommes politiques et des hommes d'affaires. Tous dans la ville de Sousse.

Tout ceci prouve la volonté des terroristes de semer le chaos dans l'une des villes clé de la Tunisie. Sousse dispose, en effet, d'une place géographique de choix, d'un important poids économique de par le nombre d'entreprises économiques qu'elle abrite et des hommes d'affaires qu'elle compte et de l'aura sportive que possède l'Etoile Sportive du Sahel, sans oublier le poids touristique qu'elle a dans le pays.

Et toujours, selon les premières conclusions de l'enquête, la cellule terroriste découverte compte pas moins de onze éléments, à savoir, six déjà arrêtés dont un de Kairouan, deux en état de fuite et trois autres pour lesquels un avis de recherche a été émis. Sachant que le chef du groupe fait partie des personnes appréhendées.

 Il s'avère, par ailleurs, que tous les membres sont dirigés par des chefs ayant prêté allégeance à Daech. Ils appartiennet, cependant, à des branches purement tunisiennes réparties entre cinq régions, à savoir, Sousse, le Grand Tunis, Kairouan et le Sud, à part les intermédiaires qui les approvisionnent en armes qui passent par le biais de la Libye.

Reste à élucider le mystère des bailleurs de fonds qui demeurent, jusqu'à présent, inconnus. Ces derniers constituent, pourtant, un maillon des plus importants puisque depuis l'avènement des actes terroristes, les services sécuritaires ne sont jamais parvenus à montrer du doigt ceux qui financent ce fléau du terrorisme. Et ce, malgré le nombre incalculable de présumés suspects et auteurs de ces crimes.

 Autre fait d'importance capitale, révélé par cette dernière opération, le fait que selon les résultats du rapport balistique, les cartouches utilisées dans la tentative d'attentat de Ridha Charfeddine sont exactement du même calibre que celles retrouvées chez cette cellule terroriste appréhendée à Sousse. Ceci prouve, de prime abord, que la tentative d'assassinat du président de l'Etoile est de nature terroriste et non pas entrant dans le cadre d'un règlement de comptes entre hommes d'affaires, comme certains ont tenté de le faire croire.

Dernier point, les membres du groupe terroriste n'ont aucun lien, selon les premiers constats, avec l'autre attentat meurtrier de l'hôtel Marhaba d'El Kantaoui de Sousse. Toutes ces données sont fondées sur les premiers résultats de l'enquête basée, elle-même, sur des aveux complets et clairs des suspects.

A rappeler que le ministère de l'Intérieur a rendu public un communiqué, le mardi 10 novembre 2015, dans lequel il lance un avis de recherche contre trois dangereux terroristes. Selon ledit communiqué il s'agit de : Nadhem Ben Abdelfatteh Ben Abdallah El Haddad, Hamza Ben Saïed Ben Hammouda Selmi et Najeh Ben Béchir Ben Amor Ben Saâd.

Le ministère de l'Intérieur appelle, en conclusion de son communiqué, tous les citoyens à informer, en urgence, les unités sécuritaires de leurs emplacements à travers des numéros mis à leur disposition à travers les médias.

Pour récapituler, on notera que deux terroristes ont été arrêtés et la voiture suspectée d'avoir été utilisée dans la tentative d'assassinat de Ridha Charfeddine a été retrouvée à Sousse.

Les forces d'intervention de la Garde nationale, en collaboration avec la Brigade de

lutte antiterroriste, ont arrêté, à Borjine (M'saken, gouvernorat Sousse), deux terroristes recherchés et ont mis la main sur la voiture suspectée dans la tentative d'assassinat de l'homme d'affaires Ridha Charfeddine, député de Nidaa Tounes et président de l'Etoile sportive du Sahel (ESS). Les deux terroristes étaient recherchés particulièrement pour l'assassinat d'un agent de police à la Cité Ezzouhour (Sousse) en août dernier.

Des sources sécuritaires ont indiqué que l'opération, qui a duré toute la soirée de dimanche, dans plusieurs localités du Sahel, a permis de mettre la main sur une grande quantité de matériel explosif et des armes à feu.

A signaler, enfin, que le ministre de l'Intérieur, Najem Gharsalli, qui s'est déplacé à Sousse, dimanche, et a suivi le déroulement de l'opération jusqu'à tard dans la soirée, a promis de tenir une conférence de presse pour présenter les tenants et aboutissants de tout ce dossier dès que l'avancement de l'enquête le permettra.

http://www.businessnews.com.tn/

France

Attentats à Paris: «Il faut agir au niveau du renseignement»

15-11-2015 Mo

Des policiers patrouillent autour du Carillon, frappé par l'une des attaques terroristes de vendredi 13 novembre 2015, à Paris.AFP PHOTO / BERTRAND GUAY

La France est-elle une cible privilégiée des terroristes de l'organisation Etat islamique et pourquoi ? La question agite la société depuis les attentats de janvier et avec encore plus d'accuité depuis vendredi soir, les pires attaques terroristes jamais connues par la France sur son sol, avec 129 morts et 350 blessés au dernier bilan. Olivier Fourt, spécialiste défense de RFI, Alain Gresh, spécialiste du Moyen-Orient et David Thomson, journaliste au service Afrique de RFI et spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes, livrent leurs analyses lors de notre édition spéciale.

RFI : la France est-elle une cible privilégiée des terroristes par rapport à d'autres nations ?

Olivier Fourt : La France est clairement une cible. Dans les années 2000, les cibles privilégiées étaient les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, Israël. Quand on a interrogé hier les chefs d'Etat africains pour leur demander des réactions, ils ont tous répondu : « *On n'est pas surpris.* » La France est en train de payer ses engagements, ces dernières années, que ce soit en Afrique - avec l'opération Barkhane au nord du Mali, l'opération Serval, et celle de Libye -, et depuis l'an dernier au Moyen-Orient, en Irak, à la demande du gouvernement irakien et dans le cadre des Nations unies. Depuis fin septembre, un nouveau pas a été franchi avec l'opération sur le territoire syrien. Et c'est d'ailleurs l'un des arguments brandis par l'organisation Etat islamique,

qui dit : « *Ce qui est en train de vous arriver, c'est de votre faute car c'est vous qui nous avez attaqués en Syrie.* »

Si la France est en guerre, qui est notre ennemi ?

Alain Gresh : C'est toute la question. Nous sommes en guerre parce que la France est présente sur beaucoup de terrains de confrontation : au Mali, en Centrafrique, en Syrie, en Irak. En même temps, ce n'est pas une guerre directe, ni une guerre traditionnelle au sens d'affrontement entre deux Etats. C'est une guerre très complexe, qui concerne avant tout le Proche-Orient et le Maghreb. Il faut bien voir que nous sommes des victimes indirectes de cette confrontation. Si on ne comprend pas que l'essentiel de ce qui se passe au Proche-Orient, avec la guerre en Syrie et en Irak, nous ne serons pas capables de combattre les conséquences. C'est un foyer de conflits, qui inclut de nombreux Etats, de nombreuses organisations, pas seulement l'Etat islamique. Il faut essayer d'analyser ces conflits.

L'ennemi principal en Syrie, est-ce l'Etat islamique ou le président syrien Bachar el-Assad ?

Alain Gresh : en tout cas, pour le gouvernement français, ce n'est pas très clair puisqu'il dit qu'il faut combattre les deux à la fois. Mais on se rend compte que dans la réalité, c'est extrêmement difficile de choisir l'ennemi.

Est-ce que la France est visée parce qu'elle a promis d'aider l'opposition syrienne si la ligne rouge était franchie et que finalement elle n'a pas agi ?

Alain Gresh : non, on ne peut pas dire ça directement. Je ne pense pas que l'Etat islamique nous vise parce qu'on n'a pas aidé l'opposition syrienne. D'abord, la France est sans doute le pays le plus présent dans la région après les Etats-Unis. Et puis, il s'est créé une image de la France dans un certain nombre de groupes comme une ennemie de l'islam. Ça va de l'interdiction du foulard dans les écoles aux raids aériens. Effectivement, aujourd'hui on est perçu comme un ennemi par un grand nombre de groupes radicaux.

David Thomson : Alain Gresh a raison de rappeler que la France est menacée au-delà de son intervention en Irak et en Syrie. C'est vrai que beaucoup d'intellectuels français reprennent en ce moment exactement le discours de l'Etat islamique, disant que les menaces et les attentats de l'EI en France sont la conséquence directe de son intervention. D'une certaine manière, c'est vrai du fait d'une bascule de l'EI.

Le jihad régional, axé uniquement sur la stratégie de construction d'un proto-Etat à cheval sur la Syrie et l'Irak, c'était sa stratégie jusqu'en septembre 2014 précisément. Et tout a changé au moment de la coalition en Irak en août 2014. Un mois après le début de l'intervention, on a un communiqué du porte-parole de l'Etat islamique, Abou Mohamed al-Adnani, qui dit : « *Maintenant, il faut viser les Français, partout, il faut les tuer, c'est un ordre officiel par tous les moyens possibles.* » L'Etat islamique passe à ce moment à une stratégie de jihad global, à la manière de l'al-Qaïda des années fin 1990-2000.

Là, effectivement, c'est l'intervention de la coalition qui le fait basculer dans cette stratégie. Mais il y a d'autres raisons. Lors de mes entretiens en 2013, avant l'intervention, on sentait bien que cette dimension terroriste faisait partie du code génétique de tous ces combattants. Dès 2013, tous les Français [jihadistes] à qui je posais

la question me disaient qu'ils rêvaient de revenir en France pour y commettre des attentats - ceux de l'Etat islamique -, ce qui n'était pas le cas d'al-Qaïda à l'époque.

Faut-il s'attendre à une riposte militaire française, à une escalade en Syrie ?

Olivier Fourt : François Hollande a dit : nous serons « *impitoyables* » avec les auteurs des attentats. Le gouvernement parle d'« *armée terroriste* » pour qualifier les troupes de l'organisation Etat islamique. La France bombarde leur position en Syrie depuis le 27 septembre - en fait, elle n'a fait que trois raids. La France est maintenant dans « le camp des cogneurs », disait-on récemment en « off » du côté de l'exécutif. Ça me gêne un peu, d'une certaine manière, parce que quand on voit ce qui s'est passé vendredi, j'ai surtout l'impression que c'est la France qui a pris des coups. Le bilan est effroyable. La jeunesse de Paris a été directement visée. La France va encaisser, les services de renseignement attendaient depuis longtemps une attaque de ce genre. Ils sont persuadés, d'ailleurs, qu'il y en aura d'autres.

Mais finalement, les services de sécurité peuvent-ils faire plus ? Faut-il bombarder plus en Irak ou en Syrie ?

Olivier Fourt : L'état-major nous dit : nous ciblons les centres de gravité de l'ennemi, nous frappons ses capacités de financement, son organisation, son organigramme, sa capacité de propagande, ses réseaux de ravitaillement, etc. La stratégie française, de ce point de vue-là, a plutôt bien fonctionné au Sahel et au Sahara, en tout cas pour ce qui est de l'élimination des principaux cadres terroristes qui opéraient dans ces régions-là. Ça me paraît beaucoup plus compliqué au Moyen-Orient, tant les moyens d'organisation sont quasiment des moyens d'Etat.

Ce qu'il s'est passé vendredi, c'est une action-suicide, certes, mais c'est quand même une action clandestine, dans un pays étranger sous surveillance, la France, avec au moins sept jihadistes déterminés et organisés. Bref, c'est la démonstration d'une incapacité pour la France à contrer les coups de l'adversaire. Mettre des militaires dans les rues n'a pas montré une grande efficacité. Et en mettre encore plus après les attaques ne servira pas à grand-chose.

Quelle est la solution dans ce cas ?

Olivier Fourt : Il faut agir en amont. Alors, bien sûr, le gouvernement communique sur le fait que des attentats sont empêchés chaque jour. Mais là, ce sont quand même sept jihadistes qui ont conduit l'opération. C'est la première opération kamikaze perpétrée sur le territoire français. C'est du niveau de ce qui se passe en Syrie et en Irak. Pour caricaturer, il ne s'agit pas d'un fou avec un couteau de cuisine qui veut attaquer l'arsenal de Toulon. Donc, la réflexion est à mener clairement au niveau du renseignement. Il faut que les agences de renseignement se parlent encore plus ! C'est le chantier du nouveau coordonnateur national du renseignement Didier Le Bret.

C'est-à-dire ?

Olivier Fourt : Il faut décloisonner encore plus l'action de la DGSE (Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure, NDLR), de la DGSI (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, NDLR), de la Direction du renseignement militaire (DRM), de Tracfin et des douanes. Il faut aussi s'appuyer sur des alliés solides et fiables : les Etats-Unis, qui ont des moyens militaires et des moyens de renseignement que la France

n'a pas, les alliés européens, mais aussi les alliés dans le monde arabe et au Maghreb, qui disposent de renseignements et de clés de compréhension que nous n'avons pas forcément. Il faut guetter les signes faibles. Ce qu'il s'est passé en Tunisie en 2011, ou ce qu'il se passe aujourd'hui dans un quartier de Casablanca, ça peut avoir des répercussions directes sur ce qu'il se passe à Paris ou à Bruxelles.

http://www.rfi.fr/

Quelle riposte face au terrorisme international de Daech ?

15 novembre 2015

Les Kurdes de Syrie et d'Irak "sont les adversaires pour l'instant les plus efficaces contre l'EI mais ce ne sera pas suffisant", explique le colonel Michel Goya. Ci-contre, un combattant kurde peshmerga à Mossoul © REUTERS/Azad Lashkari

Dès le lendemain des attentats de vendredi à Paris et aux abords du Stade de France, Daech a revendiqué officiellement ces attaques, menées, dit l'organisation terroriste, en représailles à l'engagement de la France en Syrie. Le groupe terroriste qui prévient qu'il ne s'agit là que d'un début. Face à cette menace, la riposte devra sans doute être multiple. L'analyse du colonel Michel Goya.

Le gouvernement français a promis une riposte à la hauteur de l'"*acte de guerre*" commis en plein cœur et Paris et qui a visé aussi le Stade de France vendredi 13 novembre. C'est ce qu'a dit François Hollande. C'est également ce qu'a dit Manuel Valls. "*La France est en guerre et il n'y aura pas un moment de répit pour ceux qui s'attaquent aux valeurs de la République*", a dit dimanche le Premier ministre qui a appelé plus que jamais au rassemblement et à l'unité de la nation.

L'union fera la force

Plusieurs pays appellent parallèlement depuis vendredi à une meilleure coordination. Un conseil d'urgence des ministres de l'Intérieur de l'Union européenne se tiendra d'ailleurs vendredi prochain à Bruxelles, a annoncé la présidence luxembourgeoise.

Même tonalité au sommet du G20 en Turquie. Le projet de déclaration finale de ce sommet est axé sur l'union, l'unité dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Les dirigeants présents ont réfléchi dimanche aux moyens de renforcer les contrôles aux frontières, de mieux échanger leurs informations. Ils se disent déterminer aussi à s'attaquer au financement du terrorisme. Barack Obama promet de redoubler d'efforts pour élimi-

ner le groupe Etat islamique. Nous sommes, ajoute le président américain, confrontés à "*une offensive terroriste concertée*". Cet acte terroriste n'est pas dirigé seulement contre la France mais contre "*toute l'humanité*".

Les adversaires de Daech font face à une nouvelle forme de terrorisme organisé. L'analyse d'Alain Chouet, ancien chef du service de renseignement de sécurité à la DGSE, au micro de Jérôme Cadet

La guerre contre Daech pourra-t-elle se passer d'une intervention au sol ?

Des déclarations d'intentions qui devront être suivies d'actes concrets face à une menace toujours extrêmement forte. Et pour faire face à cette menace, "*il y a un volet défensif sur le territoire national, relevant des moyens policiers, des services de renseignement, des moyens judiciaires, ... et un volet offensif qui relève des moyens militaires*", explique sur France Info le colonel Michel Goya, analyste de défense et professeur à Sciences Po.

La France est engagée, avec la coalition, dans les frappes militaires en Syrie mais "*il faut bien comprendre qu'on ne peut pas détruire l'Etat islamique sans aller au sol*", souligne Michel Goya. "*Actuellement, nous avons une stratégie d'endiguement qui repose sur des frappes, sur des raids, on élimine, on tue, on fait une grosse pression en attentat que des éléments plus fondamentaux permettent d'étouffer le problème. Mais si on veut véritablement vaincre l'Etat islamique, il faudra planter les drapeaux sur Rakka et Mossoul*", poursuit-il.

En revendiquant l'attaque d'un avion de ligne de la compagnie Metrojet, Daech a récemment visé la Russie en représailles à son engagement en Syrie. Il frappe aussi le Hezbollah qui est l'un des principaux soutiens au régime de Damas. Et vendredi, ses actions simultanées en France ont fait au moins 129 morts. "*Il y a une stratégie terroriste et spectaculaire à l'extérieur",* constate Michel Goya et parallèlement *"une stratégie militaire qui est plutôt en recul sur le terrain*". Les djihadistes de l'EI ont en effet perdu du terrain face aux Kurdes de Syrie et reculent face à ceux d'Irak qui ont récemment remporté la bataille stratégique de Sindjar, au nord de Mossoul.

La riposte contre Daech en Syrie s'organise mai jusqu'où ira-t-elle ? Les précisions d'Hervé Toutain

Il faudrait "*10 à 20 fois les moyens déployés au Mali*"

Alors, faut-il aller vers un appui massif aux combattants kurdes ? "*Oui, c'est ce que nous faisons déjà. Mais les Kurdes n'iront pas très loin non plus, pour des raisons matérielles et politiques. Ce n'est pas eux qui vont vaincre l'Etat islamique. Ce sont les adversaires pour l'instant plus efficaces et les plus redoutables contre le groupe Etat islamique mais ce ne sera pas suffisant*", explique Michel Goya.

Il donne un ordre de grandeur des moyens qui seraient selon lui nécessaires à faire tomber Daech : "*Reconquérir aujourd'hui l'espace qui est occupé par l'Etat islamique, représente à peu près 10 à 20 fois ce que nous avons dû faire au Mali, pour simplement conquérir le terrain et ce ne sera qu'une partie du problème*"...

http://www.franceinfo.fr/

Reaching out to Africa

India hosted the third India-Africa summit, an initiative which started in 2008. The first India-Africa Forum Summit was held in New Delhi in 2008 followed by the second summit in Addis Ababa in 2011. These previous summits, with participation from 15 states, were modest by comparison and the results were underwhelming to say the least. It has been a failure of Indian diplomacy that a continent with which India has enjoyed substantive ties ever since Independence now no longer views India as a priority nation and often complains of indifference on the part of New Delhi.

The summit last week was more ambitious. True to the style of the prime minister, Narendra Modi, everything about the event was grand. More than 1,000 delegates from all 54 African countries attended the summit, with more than 40 countries represented at the level of president, vice-president, prime minister and king. This was the largest ever gathering of African nations in India with even some controversial figures like the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, and the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, also making their presence felt. The Modi government even ordered the prime minister's signature sleeveless jackets for African leaders to be worn at a dinner hosted by Modi.

With this mega event, New Delhi has signalled its readiness to step up its engagement with Africa, a relationship which is centuries old, bolstered by trade across the Indian Ocean and a million-strong diaspora across Africa. A shared colonial legacy and post-Independence development experience have framed India's relationship

with Africa. India's role as a champion of anti-colonialism and anti-racism after its Independence in 1947 drew it closer to the African nations. India emerged as one of the most vocal critics of apartheid in South Africa.

In spite of being on the peripheries of global politics during the Cold War, India emerged as one of the strongest proponents of the independence of African states from colonial subjugation and a supporter of South-South cooperation in order to challenge the inequities of the global political and economic order. But India's substantive presence in Africa remained marginal as it remained focused on its own periphery through much of the Cold War period and its capabilities remained limited. Since the end of the Cold War and propelled by China's growing profile in Africa, India is reinvigorating its ties with the African continent.

India today has growing stakes in Africa. With some of the fastest growing nations in the world, the Africa of today is not the 'dark continent' of yore. The needs of regional states are divergent and their strengths are varied. India's focus over the last few decades has largely been on capacity building on the continent, providing more than $1 billion in technical assistance and training to personnel under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme. India has committed $7.5 billion to African infrastructure, covering 137 projects in more than 40 countries. India has also offered duty-free market access to Africa's least developed countries. But India's trade with Africa at $70 billion remains far below potential.

India wants a "development partnership" with Africa to be the cornerstone of its economic ties with the region. Economic engagement with Africa has become central to India's new approach. This is related to India's search for energy security in which Africa is playing an increasingly important role as India looks to diversify its oil supplies away from the Middle East. Africa accounts for about 17 per cent of India's oil imports, which are likely to grow soon.

India's partnership with Africa in recent years has focused on human resources and institutional capacity building. It is building economic and commercial ties with Africa even as it is contributing to the development of African countries through cooperation and technical assistance. It is the third-largest contributor of United Nations peacekeepers to the continent. The Indian navy is also engaged in dealing with pirates off the coast of Somalia. It has been patrolling the waters of the Indian Ocean and helping countries in eastern and southern Africa in tackling piracy and in surveillance of the exclusive economic zone. India has sought cooperation of African states in the Indian Ocean littoral to establish mechanisms for cooperation in order to deal with threats to regional security including terrorism and piracy.

There are other strategic convergences between India and various major African states. From Boko Haram in Nigeria to the growing footprint of the Islamic State, terrorism and Islamist extremism are threatening Africa like never before. India and African states can jointly address this common challenge. India is already working with the littoral states in the Indian Ocean region to ensure the security of the sea lanes of communication there. The Modi government is also seriously investing in India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN security council and Africa's 54 states will be key ones in supporting that endeavour.

Although India has committed considerable resources to Africa, delivery on the ground and implementation of projects have been far from satisfactory. Contrary to

China, India has refrained from viewing Africa through mercantilist eyes. Yet many in India feel that India has got short shrift when it comes to New Delhi's core concerns. A case in point was New Delhi's failure to secure the backing of African nations for India's permanent membership in the UN security council in 2006. China nudged the African Union into taking a position that demanded not only a permanent representation in the security council but also veto power. This led to the collapse of the nascent attempts to expand the security council.

Yet India has its own strengths in its dealings with Africa. Its democratic traditions make it a much more comfortable partner for the West compared to China in cooperating on Africa-related issues. India is viewed as a more productive partner by many in Africa because Indian companies are much better integrated into the African society and encourage technology transfers to its African partners. New Delhi will have to leverage its own strengths in making a lasting compact with Africa and regain its lost presence on the continent.

Today all major powers including the United States of America, China, Japan, and the European states are wooing Africa with investments and trade linkages at a time when Africa is beginning to engage the world on its own terms. India will have to ensure that it remains relevant to Africa's rapidly changing needs. A mega India-Africa summit will be worth the investment if the follow-up is as meticulous as the planning for the summit itself.

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http://www.telegraphindia.com/

What empowers ISIS

November 5, 2015

*(CNN)*Whether or not ISIS [brought down](#) Metrojet Flight 9268 in the Sinai Peninsula, the terrorist group has catapulted itself from obscurity to lead the global jihadist movement in just 18 months.

ISIS controls territory in Syria and Iraq that by some estimates is the size of the United Kingdom, and it lords over millions of people in both countries.

The group has also secured pledges of allegiance from two dozen militant organizations from around the Muslim world, including in the Sinai and Egypt's neighbor Libya, while around 10 other groups have declared some form of solidarity with ISIS.

The key to ISIS' success is not the group's military strength -- ISIS in Syria and Iraq may number only about 20,000 to 30,000 fighters -- but the weaknesses of the [regimes](#) where the group is doing well.

Think of the Sunni militant group ISIS as a pathogen that preys on weak hosts in the Muslim world.

24 photos: Russian plane crashes in Egypt

In 2014 ISIS seized huge swaths of Iraq, exploiting the fact that the country had been in a civil war for more than a decade and the Iraqi government had pursued a policy of excluding Sunnis from power.

ISIS is one of the most powerful players in Syria because the country has been embroiled in a civil war since 2011 and the [regime of Bashar al-Assad](#) has imposed a

reign of terror on its Sunni population, including the use of chemical weapons and widespread torture. For the moment, ISIS and the countries allied against it, including the United States, have come to something of a stalemate in Iraq and Syria.

Gadhafi ouster created vacuum

However, ISIS also has a significant foothold in Libya because the country is embroiled in a civil war, which was instigated by the U.S.-led overthrow of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi four years ago. (This move may turn out to be the most significant foreign policy blunder of the Obama administration as there was no serious American plan for what would follow Gadhafi -- the same negligence that had characterized George W. Bush's overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.)

56 photos: The ISIS terror threat

ISIS is growing in Egypt because a military dictator who seized power in a coup leads the country, and he has brutally quashed all forms of dissent, including criminalizing the Muslim Brotherhood, which has many millions of members in Egypt and had formed the previous government. It's fertile soil for ISIS, which had done particularly well in the Sinai, leading an insurgency there that has killed hundreds.

Although it has not enjoyed any of the kind of success that ISIS has, al Qaeda is also benefitting from the crisis of governance that has gripped much of the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011. The civil war in Yemen precipitated by the Arab Spring has boosted al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is expanding its operations in southern Yemen.

Al Qaeda is also enjoying something of a comeback in the place from which it launched the 9/11 strikes: southern Afghanistan. The combination of a weak central government and the sharp drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan has provided an opening for the group. Last week U.S. and Afghan forces in Kandahar province destroyed "probably the largest" al Qaeda training camp discovered

during the 14-year Afghan War, according to Gen. John Campbell, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan.

5 ways ISIS gains

In addition to the opportunities that weak governments and civil wars in the Muslim world provide to ISIS, the group also benefits from five other factors.

First, it is victorious. It might seem tautological to say that ISIS is doing well because it is doing well, but that is surely part of its appeal. ISIS released a video in the summer of 2014 showing a [bulldozer breaking down](#) the great sand berm that demarcated the Iraq-Syrian border first established by Britain and France in their secret agreement to carve up the Ottoman Empire following the end of World War I. It was ISIS' symbolic first step toward its goal of expunging all vestiges of Western influence in the Arab world over the past century. Al Qaeda could only have dreamed of such a victory.

Second, ISIS adeptly plugs into a strain of apocalyptic thinking in Islam and has positioned itself as the vanguard instigating the final showdown between the West and Islam. ISIS' distinctive black flags are a reference to a hadith, a saying of the Prophet Mohammed: "If you see the black banners coming from the direction of Khorasan, then go to them, even if you have to crawl, because among them will be Allah's Caliph the Mahdi." In other words, from Khorasan -- an ancient term for the region that now encompasses Afghanistan -- will come an army bearing black flags that includes the Mahdi, the Islamic savior of the world.

Even the name of ISIS's English-language webzine, Dabiq, is an allusion to ancient prophecy; some believe the Prophet Mohammed predicted the Syrian town of Dabiq to be the site of the final battle between the armies of Islam and "Rome," which will occasion the end of time and the triumph of true Islam.

8 photos: Agony of the Yazidis

Third, after seizing the second-largest city in Iraq, Mosul, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi named himself caliph, which meant that in his own mind and in the eyes of his followers he was not only the leader of ISIS but of Muslims everywhere. For true believers in ISIS' message, it's a religious obligation to join the caliphate that Baghdadi leads.

Fourth, if al Qaeda was the Harvard of terrorist groups, an elite institution with relatively few members -- only around 200 at the time of the 9/11 attacks -- ISIS accepts all comers, enabling it to build insurgent armies in Iraq and Syria and to attract an estimated 1,000 "foreign fighters" a month that continue to pour in from around the Muslim world as well as to bring on board its many affiliates.

Fifth, ISIS is virulently anti-Shia and is a symptom of the deepening tensions between the Shiite and Sunni sects of Islam across the Arab world that is driven, in part, by substantial Iranian and Gulf state funding. ISIS can position itself to Sunnis that it is the most effective wager of war against Shiites as it battles both Hezbollah in Syria and the Shia-Alawite regime of Assad as well as the Iran-backed Iraqi government.

Al Qaeda split

Right now al Qaeda and ISIS are at odds about who leads the global jihadist movement, but the real nightmare for counterterrorism officials is if the two groups were to reunite. After all, the parent of ISIS was al Qaeda in Iraq, which less than two years ago was part of al Qaeda.

U.S. intel suggests ISIS bomb brought down plane 03:11

The split between the two groups in early 2014 was largely driven by personal differences rather than any fundamental disagreements about their end goals, which are to establish Taliban-style rule from Indonesia to Morocco and to end all Western influence in the Muslim world.

If, as U.S. officials say their intelligence suggests and ISIS asserts, it was indeed an ISIS bomb that blew up Metrojet Flight 9268 the group will be seen by its growing numbers of supporters as bringing those goals a little closer.

http://edition.cnn.com/

ISIS Has a New Favorite Social Media Network

3 November 2015

Terror Jihadi groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda are now shifting much of their social media propaganda, recruiting and fund transferring from mainstream social media sites like Twitter to a service called Telegram, according to a new report by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC).

ISIS and other militant groups have been jumping from one social media service to another in their attempts to avoid anti-terrorism programs by governments and corporations. They appear to have settled on Telegram. "The Jihadis' struggle to keep up with the relentless suspensions and removal of jihadi social media content may have finally run its course," says Veryan Khan, the Editorial Director at TRAC. "The new frontier of jihadi communication is taking place on a recently launched tool, in a messaging platform that has revolutionized the social media sphere."

Telegram was launched in August 2013 by the two Russian brothers, Nicolay and Pavel Durov, as a free encrypted instant messaging service. While reports of terror groups using Telegram surfaced months ago, a new feature called "Channels" was launched in September to let users broadcast to other members of the service. It quickly turned Telegram into the favorite social media hub of ISIS and other terror groups.

"It is this new feature that has been enthusiastically embraced by many militant groups, becoming an underground railroad for distributing and archiving jihadi propaganda materials," the TRAC report says.

As of Nov. 2, TRAC has recorded more than 200 major jihadi channels. Half of them belong to ISIS. Other major players in the jihadi world, from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to Jabhat al-Nusra to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya to Jaysh al-Islam,

are increasingly creating their own channels. The rate of membership growth for the channels has been staggering, quickly climbing to about 150,000 total members, the report concludes.

"The sheer scale and momentum of the *Telegram* migration is hard to fathom," says Brian Watts, an author of the TRAC report. "The force of the numbers using Telegram channels is staggering, watching hundreds of new members in an hours' time; thousands coming on in over a few days is commonplace for many channels."

The rapid shift to Telegram by ISIS and other groups represents a wholesale change to terrorists' communication style, Watts adds. ISIS's popular website for video circulation, ISDARAT, has five *Telegram* channels. ISDARAT is often shut down by authorities, but with *Telegram's* guarantee of permanence, and the capacity to transfer any type of file via a channel, ISDARAT no longer needs to hide.

As a result, Telegram and its chat feature have become essential to ISIS's recruiting efforts — and to its money-moving activities. While it has been possible to transfer funds via text message in the past, Telegram makes that type of exchange more appealing. The service is encrypted and it offers a feature that allows users to set messages to "self-destruct" after a certain period of time. Accounts can also be eliminated after periods of inactivity. Additionally, sending payments in bitcoin allows both senders and recipients to remain anonymous, and bots developed to handle transfers of crypto-currency can make it even harder to track who is moving money around the world.

"The use of *Telegram* and other messaging applications to transfer funds (and other assets of value) is expected to be a rapidly changing environment that will require constant monitoring," says Bethany Rudibaugh, another author of the report.

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/

Attaques terroristes à Paris : affaibli en Syrie, comment l'Etat islamique cherche désormais à terrifier l'Europe pour exister

14 Novembre 2015

Plusieurs attaques ont éclaté en plein Paris Vendredi soir, le bilan le lendemain s'élevait à 128 morts. L'État islamique a revendiqué Samedi midi dans un communiqué ces attentats. Alors qu'il est déstabilisé en Syrie, l'E.I. cherche désormais tous les moyens pour exister.

Atlantico : Que sait-on à cette heure-ci sur la nature de ces attaques, et l'auteur de ces actes ?

Alain Chouet : Les médias ont largement rendu compte de la nature des attaques qui mettent en jeu pour la première fois en France des professionnels de la violence à détermination kamikaze, ce qui n'était pas le cas d'amateurs comme Sid Ahmed Ghlam, le tireur du Thalys ou « l'homme au couteau ».

Quant à l'identification des assaillants, il est prématuré de se prononcer même si, d'après des témoignages convergents, il semble qu'ils étaient Français ou résidents de longue date en France.

Alain Rodier : Daesh a revendiqué les attentats de Paris et de la Seine St Denis du vendredi 13 novembre soir. Sans entrer dans le détail, une première analyse de ce texte diffusé en (bon) français permet de dire qu'il est crédible. Ce fait est important car il convient de déterminer qui est vraiment derrière ces actions terroristes. A savoir que ceux dirigés contre Charlie Hebdo en janvier de cette année étaient le fait

d'Al-Qaida "canal historique" via sa filiale yéménite, Al-Qaida dans la Péninsule Arabique (AQPA). En effet, au moins un des deux frères Kouachi avait effectué un stage de formation au Yémen. Certes, Amedy Coulibaly, l'auteur de la mort d'une policière municipale et d'un agent de la voirie puis de l'action terroriste dirigée contre l'Hypercasher porte de Vincennes s'est revendiqué de Daesh mais aucune déclaration officielle n'est venue confirmer les dires de ce pistolero recruté par les frères Kouachi qui l'avaient connu en prison.

Depuis plusieurs mois, les menaces pesaient sur tout le pays, et plus particulièrement sur la capitale. S'attendait-on à des attentats d'une telle ampleur ?

Alain Chouet : Cela fait presque un an que les services de renseignement agitent le drapeau d'alerte pour essayer de faire comprendre que, le jour ou l'EI perdrait pied militairement sur le terrain, il dégénérerait stratégiquement (comme al-Qaïda dans la période 1998-2001) et dériverait vers ce genre d'action pour continuer de conserver une crédibilité, d'exister politiquement et de recevoir des soutiens extérieurs.

Nous sommes arrivés à ce point.

Que doit-on retenir de ces attaques ? Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire de la stratégie de l'État islamique en Occident ? Que cherchent-ils ?

Alain Chouet : En affaiblissant réellement sur le terrain les forces militaires de l'Etat islamique et de différents groupes djihadistes, l'intervention conjuguée des forces russes en Syrie et kurdes en Irak contraint les responsables politiques et militaires salafistes à revoir leur dispositif et à manifester une capacité de nuisance « universelle ». Les attentats de Paris s'inscrivent dans la continuité de l'attentat contre l'avion russe en Egypte, des attentats anti-chiites de Beyrouth et Baghdad et sont sans doute le prélude à d'autres attentats dans les pays occidentaux membres de la coalition. **Affaibli sur le terrain, l'Etat islamique va tenter de susciter des tensions violentes et un mur de haine entre les communautés musulmanes résidant en Europe et les pays d'accueil.** Le meilleur moyen d'y parvenir est de contraindre ces pays d'accueil à des mesures coercitives difficiles à différencier et à moduler contre les communautés musulmanes.

Alain Rodier : Cela semble accréditer la thèse du changement de stratégie de Daesh. En effet, ce mouvement salafiste-djihadiste concentrait ses efforts sur la guerre qu'il mène sur son berceau syro-irakien et dans ses "provinces" (wilayat) Sinaï, libyenne, nigériane et afghane. Le tournant semble être marqué par les attentats récents dirigés contre l'Airbus russe de Charm-el-Cheikh (information sûre à 90%) et celui contre le Hezbollah libanais à Beyrouth. Cela est très inquiétant car cela préfigure vraisemblablement une série d'autres actions terroristes de par le monde. Daesh veut "exister" via ces opérations destinées à terroriser ses ennemis "impies".

Il faut être convaincu d'une chose : la France est en guerre contre les organisations salafiste-djihadistes (Al-Qaïda "canal historique" et Daesh) et il convient que nos concitoyens en soient persuadés. Cela va influer sur la vie de tous les jours et aura, en particulier un impact économique dont la société se serait bine passée. Nous sommes attaqués et la riposte doit être à la mesure de l'agression -les combats politico-politiciens typiquement franchouillards doivent pour une fois être mis au moins temporairement en arrière-plan-. Et surtout, point de fatalisme, il faut

"résister" comme les Britanniques l'ont glorieusement fait contre les bombardements nazis de 1941.

Quelles réponses possibles la France pourra t-elle donner ? Peut-on s'attendre à un renforcement de la coalition avec la Syrie ?

Alain Chouet : Même si ses citoyens n'en avaient pas clairement conscience parce que les choses se passent loin, la France est en guerre sur plusieurs fronts au Sahel et au Moyen Orient. Elle en subit les conséquences mais ne peut décréter l'état de guerre sur son propre sol sans faire le jeu des djihadistes. Dans la mesure où on ne peut mettre un gendarme derrière chaque citoyen, la menace perdurera autant qu'existeront en Syrie, en Irak, au Sahel de vastes zones contrôlées par les criminels islamistes. Il est donc plus que jamais urgent de mettre fin à l'existence de ces zones de non-droit et à y rétablir l'autorité d'Etats responsables même si leur système politique ne nous satisfait pas.

 Dans son communiqué, l'État islamique met en garde en écrivant que "ce n'est que le début de la tempête". La guerre est-elle clairement déclarée ?

Alain Chouet : Il y a une part de rhétorique dans cette affirmation. Les responsables de l'EI ne vont évidemment pas dire : « On vous a frappés très fort et on s'arrête là ». En vue de mobiliser leurs partisans et de faire basculer en leur faveur les esprits faibles, ils ont tout intérêt à maintenir leur pression terroriste beaucoup plus facile à mettre en œuvre que des ripostes militaires sur le terrain et beaucoup plus mobilisatrices en direction de l'ensemble du monde musulman.

Oui, la guerre est déclarée, mais elle n'a pas été déclarée aujourd'hui. Elle existe depuis que nous avons toléré, et parfois encouragé, l'existence de bandes armées salafistes et elle continuera tant que nous ne les aurons pas éradiquées par une démarche collective et résolue associant nos partenaires des pays arabes et musulmans.

Alain Rodier : Afin de prendre un peu de recul, il convient de noter que Daesh subit certains reculs sur le front syro-irakien. Il serait toutefois faux d'affirmer qu'il est en passe d'être vaincu. Tout au plus, il n'est plus en "odeur de victoire". Ce fait est très important car il peut ternir engouement que connaît le mouvement depuis sa création en juin 2014. Or, Daesh est très dépendant de l'apport de volontaires étrangers qui viennent renforcer ses rangs estimés entre 30 000 à 50 000 combattants, ce qui est peu pour contrôler l' "État" Islamique (EI). Déclencher une vague de terreur à l'étranger (en dehors du foyer syro-irakien) lui permet d'exister.

Vous expliquez que l'Etat islamique est affaibli en Syrie. Peut-on imaginer qu'il cherche alors à affecter l'Europe à travers les flux de réfugiés ?

Alain Chouet : Jusqu'à présent, l'Etat Islamique ne s'est pas encore servi des ces flux migratoires, car ils représentaient trop de risques pour eux. En revanche, **maintenant que l'Etat islamique perd de plus en plus de terrain et se sent attaqué, il se peut qu'il cherche à utiliser tous les moyens pour exister, et cela va se révéler être de plus en plus compliqué**

http://www.atlantico.fr/

Washington se prépare à la troisième guerre mondiale

Dans une analyse de Patrick Martin, un journaliste français, publiée sur wikistrike, hier, l'auteur met l'accent sur les derniers évènements qui chauffent le pentagone, depuis que le monde est devenu une arène d'un combat qui ne dit pas son nom entre les USA, la Russie et la Chine. Selon l'analyste, le monde se réveille une troisième fois sous le choc de Course aux armements nucléaires qui prédit une approche systématique du risque d'une Troisième Guerre Mondiale. Nous reproduisons ci-dessous cette publication à chaud faite par Patrick Martin.

Le complexe militaire et du renseignement américain est engagé dans des préparatifs systématiques pour la Troisième Guerre Mondiale. Pour le Pentagone, un conflit militaire avec la Chine et / ou la Russie est inévitable, et cette perspective est devenue la force motrice de sa planification tactique et stratégique. Trois audiences au Congrès américain mardi ont démontré cette réalité. Dans la matinée, le Comité des services armés du Sénat a tenu une longue audience sur la cyberguerre. Dans l'après-midi, un sous-comité du Comité des services armés de la Chambre des représentants a discuté de la taille et du déploiement actuels de la flotte américaine de porte-avions, tandis qu'un autre sous-comité du même panel a discuté de la modernisation des armes nucléaires américaines. Le World Socialist Web Site fournira un compte rendu plus détaillé de ces audiences, auxquelles a assisté un reporter du WSWS, mais certaines observations préliminaires peuvent déjà être faites. Aucune des audiences n'a discuté des implications plus larges des préparatifs de guerre américains, ni de ce qu'une guerre majeure entre des puissances dotées d'armes nucléaires pourrait signifier pour la survie de la race humaine, et même pour la vie sur notre planète. Au contraire, ces audiences étaient des exemples de ce qu'on pourrait appeler la banalisation de la Troisième Guerre Mondiale. Une guerre des États-Unis contre la Chine et /ou la Russie était l'hypothèse de base, et les témoignages des intervenants ainsi que les questions des sénateurs et des représentants, démocrates comme républicains, portaient sur les meilleures méthodes pour l'emporter dans un tel conflit. Ces audiences font partie d'un processus continu. Les témoins ont parlé de leurs écrits et de leurs déclarations passés. Les sénateurs et les représentants ont fait référence au témoignage précédent d'autres intervenants. En d'autres termes, les préparatifs de la guerre mondiale, utilisant des armes cybernétiques, des porte-avions, des bombardiers, des missiles et toutes les autres armes disponibles, sont en cours depuis longtemps. Ces préparatifs ne sont pas une réponse à des événements récents, que ce soit en mer de Chine du Sud, en Ukraine, en Syrie ou ailleurs. Chacune de ces audiences considère comme acquis un conflit majeur des États-Unis avec une autre grande puissance (parfois sans la nommer, parfois explicitement désignée comme la Chine ou la Russie) dans un laps de temps relativement court, des années plutôt que des décennies. Le danger du terrorisme sans cesse matraqué pour créer une panique de l'opinion publique, a été minimisé et dans une certaine mesure écarté. À un moment de l'audience du Sénat sur la cyberguerre, en réponse à une question directe de la démocrate Jeanne Shaheen du New Hampshire, les témoins du panel ont tous déclaré que leur plus grande préoccupation venait des États-nations, pas des terroristes.a
Des navires de guerre américains et chinois se livrent bataille en mer…
L'un des intervenants à cette audience était le Dr Peter W. Singer répertorié comme

un « stratège et collaborateur émérite » de New America, un groupe de réflexion de Washington. Il a intitulé son exposé, « Les leçons de la Troisième Guerre Mondiale ». Il a commencé sa déclaration par la description suivante de ce conflit qu'il imagine :

« Des navires de guerre américains et chinois se livrent bataille en mer, usant de toutes les armes, des canons aux missiles de croisière et aux lasers. Des avions de combat furtifs russes et américains s'opposent dans l'air, avec des drones robotiques en auxiliaires. Des cyberpirates à Shanghaï et dans la Silicon Valley se battent en duel sur les terrains numériques. Et les combats dans l'espace décident qui gagne dessous sur Terre. Ces scènes, sont-elles tirées d'un roman ou bien ce qui pourrait effectivement avoir lieu dans le monde réel après-demain ? La réponse est les deux ». Aucune des audiences n'a donné lieu à un débat soit sur la probabilité d'une guerre majeure ou sur la nécessité de gagner cette guerre. Personne n'a contesté l'hypothèse que la « victoire » dans une guerre mondiale entre les puissances nucléaires soit un concept sensé. La discussion a été entièrement consacrée aux technologies, aux équipements et aux ressources humaines nécessaires pour que l'armée américaine l'emporte. Ce fut tout aussi vrai pour les sénateurs et les représentants démocrates que pour leurs homologues républicains. Selon la coutume, les deux partis sont disposés sur les flancs opposés du président du comité ou du sous-comité. Sans cette disposition, il n'y aurait aucun moyen de déterminer le parti auquel ils adhèrent, tellement leurs questions et les opinions qu'ils exprimaient se ressemblaient. Contrairement à la représentation de Washington dans les médias comme profondément divisé entre des partis aux perspectives politiques inconciliablement opposées, il y avait un accord bipartite sur la plus fondamentale des questions, la préparation d'une nouvelle guerre impérialiste mondiale. L'unanimité des représentants politiques du grand patronat n'implique en aucun cas qu'il n'y ait pas d'obstacles à cette marche vers la guerre. Chacune des audiences s'attaquait, de différentes manières, à la crise profonde à laquelle est confronté l'impérialisme américain. Cette crise a deux composantes principales : le déclin de la puissance économique des États-Unis par rapport à leurs principaux rivaux, et les contradictions internes de la société américaine, avec l'aliénation grandissante de la classe ouvrière et en particulier des jeunes.

La peur du Senat américain

Lors de l'audience du sous-comité de la Chambre des représentants sur les porte-avions, le président a fait remarquer que l'un des intervenants, un amiral haut gradé, avait exprimé sa préoccupation au sujet « d'une marine à 11 porte-avions dans un monde où il en faudrait 15 ». Il y a tellement de défis auxquels est confronté Washington, a-t-il poursuivi, qu'en réalité il faudrait en avoir 21 – le double du nombre actuel, ce qui entraînerait la faillite même d'un pays avec beaucoup plus de ressources que les États-Unis. L'audience du Sénat sur la cyber sécurité a abordé brièvement l'opposition interne au militarisme américain. Le principal intervenant, le général à la retraite Keith Alexander, ancien directeur de la National Security Agency et ancien chef du CyberCommand du Pentagone, a déploré l'effet des fuites de l'ancien employé de la NSA, Edward Snowden et du soldat Chelsea Manning, déclarant que « les attaques d'initiés » étaient l'une des menaces les plus graves auxquelles l'armée américaine était confrontée. Le sénateur démocrate Joe Manchin de Virginie occidentale lui a demandé directement, en se référant à Snowden, « Faut-il

le traiter comme un traître » ? Alexander a répondu, « Il doit être traité comme un traître et jugé comme tel ». Manchin hocha la tête vigoureusement, en accord évident. Alors que les témoins et les sénateurs ont choisi d'utiliser les noms de Snowden et de Manning pour incarner « l'ennemi intérieur », ils étaient clairement conscients que l'opposition intérieure à la guerre est beaucoup plus large que ces quelques lanceurs d'alerte. Ceci n'est pas simplement une question de la révulsion profonde chez les travailleurs en réponse à 14 ans d'interventions sanglantes impérialistes en Afghanistan, en Irak, en Somalie, en Libye, en Syrie, au Yémen et en Afrique du Nord, si importante soit-elle. Une guerre entre les États-Unis et une grande puissance comme la Chine ou la Russie, même s'il était possible d'empêcher son escalade en un échange nucléaire tous azimuts, impliquerait une mobilisation colossale des ressources de la société américaine, à la fois économiques et humaines. Cela signifierait de nouvelles réductions spectaculaires des conditions de vie du peuple américain, combinées avec un lourd tribut de sang qui tomberaient inévitablement et principalement sur les enfants de la classe ouvrière. Depuis la guerre du Vietnam, l'armée américaine a fonctionné uniquement sur la base du volontariat, en évitant la conscription, qui a provoqué une large opposition et un défi direct dans les années 1960 et au début des années 1970. Une guerre non-nucléaire avec la Russie ou la Chine signifierait la réintroduction de la conscription et imposerait le coût humain de la guerre à chaque famille en Amérique. Dans ces conditions, peu importe le renforcement des pouvoirs de la police et le recours à des mesures répressives contre les sentiments anti-guerre, la stabilité de la société américaine serait mise à l'épreuve. L'élite dirigeante américaine a profondément peur des conséquences politiques, et elle a raison de l'avoir.

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